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Introduction
LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND transgender ("LGBT") adoles-
cents occupy a unique position in the American legal landscape. They
are disproportionately at risk of harm when they go through the nor-
mal adolescent process of trying on identities, finding out who they
are, and proclaiming their identities to their peers.' For instance, con-
sider the case of Jamie Nabozny. For four years, Nabozny suffered
homophobic verbal and physical harassment from students at his pub-
lic high school in Ashland, Wisconsin. 2 These students pretended to
rape him, urinated on him, and kicked him so many times he needed
stomach surgery.3 When Nabozny reported the harassment to school
officials, they told him he should expect it for being gay.4 Nabozny
eventually attempted suicide and dropped out of school.5
Sadly, Nabozny's story is not unique. A large number of minors
face harassment every day, and many suffer in silence. 6 Because mi-
nors currently lack a clear legal right of access to courts-one that
does not involve the minor's parents-minors brave enough to en-
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1. See infra Part L.A-C (disusing adolescent process).
2. See Nabozny v. Poldesny, 92 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 1996).
3. See id. at 451-52.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 452.
6. See infra Part I.
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force their rights face huge obstacles. If a minor is being harassed or
wants to challenge a legal policy, but does not want her parents to
know her sexuality, she essentially has no options. This Article argues
that state legislatures should amend their procedural rules by giving
minors explicit rights to petition for the appointment of guardians ad
litem 7 in situations where they need to exercise their legal rights. For
example, Jamie Nabozny's story has a semi-happy ending. Because his
parents were supportive of his lawsuit, Nabozny was able to sue his
former school.8 This suit led to the first ever finding that a public
school could be held liable for failing to stop anti-gay abuse (the case
ultimately settled for approximately one million dollars).9 It also sent
a message to other schools that they, too, could be held liable for
permitting the harassment of gay students.
This case illustrates the importance of access to courts. Nabozny
was able to go to court because he told his parents about his sexual
orientation and his parents supported his lawsuit. But many minors
wishing to keep their sexual orientation from their parents do not
have access to the courts, simply because they happen to live in the
wrong states. A right of access to courts independent of one's parents
would allow these minors to seek enforcement of pre-existing statu-
tory rights, and to challenge the constitutionality of a statute or of a
school district's action. Even if only a few minors invoked this right, it
would benefit many other minors, in the same way that Nabozny's
case sent a message to other school districts. And, the existence of
such a right could eventually lead to the creation of similar rights for
minors in other areas where they are currently lacking.
Part I discusses the unique situations LGBT adolescents face and
how a right of access to courts would help these minors. Part II dis-
cusses United States Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding parents'
rights and minors' rights, and how to resolve conflicts between the
two. Part II concludes that the Supreme Court has consistently privi-
leged the best interests of the minor and recognized the importance
of assisting minors in making informed decisions and developing into
mature adults. Part III reports the results of a fifty-state survey on state
procedural statutes, detailing the current state of the law for minors in
7. Some states use the term "next friend" rather than "guardian ad litem." This Arti-
cle uses the term "guardian ad litem" to refer to anyone appointed to represent a minor in
a pending legal action.
8. Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 453.
9. Id. at 456-58; Lambda Legal, Summary of Nabozny v. Podlesny, http://lambdalegal.
org/our-work/in-court/cases/nabozny-v-podlesny.html (last visited May 1, 2009).
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need of access to the judicial process, and how those laws have been
interpreted by state courts. Part IV discusses the current legal treat-
ment of adolescence and the mature minor doctrine, and finds a na-
tional trend toward increased state law rights for adolescents. Part V
explores theories of adolescent decision-making, and argues that ado-
lescents are capable of making the decision to go to court. Parts VI
and VII conclude that minors should be allowed to bring cases
through guardians ad litem without parental notification/consent,
and explore potential ways to codify this right.
I. LGBT Minors and Identity Rights
A. LGBT Teens and Their Parents
Many LGBT teens do not feel able to come out to their parents.
For example "[s] tudies suggest that approximately one out of every
four [LGBT] youth are forced out of their homes because of conflicts
with families over their sexual orientation or gender identity."' 0 More-
over, as many as half of all LGBT youth may encounter some form of
parental rejection because of their sexual orientation."I LGBT minors
have also faced conversion therapy and institutionalization. 12 For the
minors unfortunate enough to live in intolerant families, coming out
presents a serious risk of emotional and physical danger.
Even minors who do not face such drastic consequences may not
want to disclose their sexuality to their parents. Adolescence is a time
for identity exploration, a process that involves differentiating oneself
from one's parents and receiving input from one's peers. 13 Thus, it
may be developmentally critical for a gay teen to disclose her identity
to her peers or to other adults before disclosing her identity to her
parents.
B. LGBT School Issues
On February 12, 2008, in Oxnard, California, fifteen-year-old
Lawrence King was murdered by a fellow eighth grader inside his jun-
10. Sonia Renee Martin, Note, A Child's Right to Be Gay: Addressing the Emotional Mal-
treatment of Queer Youth, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 167, 176 (1996).
11. Id. (referencing a study conducted by the Hetrick-Martin Institute).
12. See David B. Cruz, Controlling Desires: Sexual Orientation Conversion and the Limits of
Knowledge and Law, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 1297, 1300, 1333-50 (1997); Laura A. Gans, Inverts,
Perverts, and Converts: Sexual Orientation Conversion Therapy and Liability, 8 B.U. PuB. Nr. L.J.
219, 220 (1999); Tyler Talbot, Comment, Reparative Therapy for Homosexual Teens: The Choice
of the Teen Should Be the Only Choice Discussed, 27J. Juv. L. 33, 40-42 (2006).
13. See infra Part I.D.
Spring 2009]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
ior high school's computer lab. 14 The killing reportedly occurred be-
cause King was openly gay. 15 King's murder starkly emphasizes that
America's schools are not yet safe for America's lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender youth.
In the 2007 Gay, Lesbian, and Straight Educational Network
School Climate Survey, almost two-thirds (60.8%) of LGBT high
school students reported feeling unsafe at school because of their sex-
ual orientation, and 38.4% felt unsafe because of how they expressed
their gender.' 6 A majority of students reported experiencing some
form of harassment or violence at school: 86.2% had been verbally
harassed because of their sexual orientation, and 66.5% had been ver-
bally harassed because of their gender expression. 17 Over one third of
the students (44.1%) had been physically harassed because of their
sexual orientation, and over one quarter (30.4%) were physically
harassed because of their gender expression.' 8 Nearly one fifth
(22.1%) were physically assaulted because of their sexual orientation,
and over a tenth (14.2%) were assaulted because of their gender ex-
pression. 19 Almost all students in the survey reported some form of
"relational aggression (such as being the target of mean rumors or
lies), and having their property damaged or stolen," and 55.4% had
been the victim of "cyberbullying. '' 20 Finally, 73.6% of students re-
ported hearing homophobic remarks such as "faggot" or "dyke" fre-
quently or commonly at school.21 Thus, at a time when most teens are
freely exploring their identities, 22 these teens are busy hiding, or risk-
ing harassment and violence if they choose to be open about who they
are.
Slowly, legislatures and school districts have passed anti-gay har-
assment policies and laws to respond to this harassment. 23 While anti-
harassment policies can be ineffective if left unenforced by adminis-
trators, anti-harassment statutes give LGBT adolescents powerful legal
14. Rebecca Cathcart, Boy's Killing, Labeled a Hate Crime, Stuns a Town, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
23, 2008, at All.
15. Id.
16. GAY, LESBIAN, & STRAIGHT EDuc. NETWORK, THE 2007 NATIONAL SCHOOL CLIMATE
SURVEY, at xiii (2005), available at www.glsen.org/cgi-bin/iowa/all/library/record/2340.
h tml?state=research.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See infta Part IV.
23. See infra Part III.
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recourse. However, these statutes are only as effective as the state pro-
cedural laws applicable to these adolescents. If a state law does not
permit a minor to bring a cause of action without parental involve-
ment and the harassed minor either does not want her parents to
know her sexual orientation, or does not think her parents would be
supportive of a lawsuit, her only legal remedy is barred.
Many high school students have responded to this continuing
harassment by forming gay-straight alliances. 24 The importance of
these alliances to an LGBT minor's identity development cannot be
understated. 25 Association with similar individuals is a key part of
identity development. These alliances may make the difference be-
tween the LGBT teen developing a healthy identity and the LGBT
teen facing mental health issues such as depression and even sui-
cide. 26 Despite these benefits, many school districts have fought the
creation of gay-straight alliances, or have responded to the creation of
an alliance by requiring parental-consent before a student joins any
club. 27 This places the minor afraid to come out to her parents in a
Catch 22. Although these school policies may be unconstitutional, in
many states a minor cannot get to court to challenge them without
parental consent/notification. 28 Yet a minor afraid to join a gay-
straight alliance because she does not want her parents to know about
her sexuality is unlikely to seek parental consent to pursue such a
lawsuit.
24. See, e.g., Debra Lau Whelan, Judge Gives Green Light to Florida High School Gay-
Straight Alliance, SCH. LIBR. J. (New York), Mar. 11, 2009, http://www.schoollibraryjournal.
com/index.asp?layout=talkbackCommentsFull&talk backheaderid=6589942&articleid=
CA6643654; Charles Menchaca, Inclusiveness, Safety Goals of Gay UWMC Students, WAUSAU
DAILYJ., Apr. 1, 2009, http://www.wausaudailyherald.com/article/20090401/WDHO11I/
904010622/1981 /WDHopinion.
25. See infra Part V.
26. See infra Part V.
27. See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., ACLU Wins Preliminary
Injunction in Yulee High School "Gay-Straight Alliance" (Mar. 11, 2009), available at http:/
/www.aclufl.org/news_events/index.cfm?action=viewRelease&emailAlertD=3718; Press
Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., Okeechobee High School Gay-Straight Alliance
Wins Groundbreaking Federal Lawsuit (July 30, 2008), available at http://www.aclufl.org/
newsevents/?action=viewRelease&emailAlertlD=3654; Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties
Union, Federal Appeals Court Rules Osseo, MN School Must Treat Gay Student Club
Equally (Aug. 29, 2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/lgbt/youth/36600prs20080829.
html; AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF UTAH, STUDENTS' RIGHT TO FORM GAY-STRAIGHT ALLI-
ANCES (2007), available at http://www.acluutah.org/gsa.pdf.
28. See infra Part III (discussing results of fifty-state survey).
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C. Transgender Minors
Another group targeted for abuse and harassment by their peers
are transgender teenagers. The term transgender comprises a wide
range of individuals, including "transsexuals, transvestites, male and
female impersonators, drag kings and queens, male-to-female persons,
female-to-male persons, cross-dressers, gender benders, gender vari-
ant, gender nonconforming, and ambiguously gendered persons."29
Although many children who identify as transgender do not continue
to do so,3 0 rates of those continuing to identify as transgender during
adulthood are much higher for adolescents than children.31 There is
also evidence that for some members of the transgender population,
puberty brings with it intense emotional distress that can be reduced
by beginning a gender transition. 32 Because of this, the Harry Benja-
min International Gender Dysphoria Association's ("HBIGDA") Stan-
dards of Care-the most widely accepted treatment standard for
transgender individuals-recommends that adolescents proceed
slowly through three stages. These stages encourage clinicians to bal-
ance the fact that gender identity may be malleable-especially in
young children-against the intense distress that a transgender ado-
lescent may face.33
In the first stage, termed "pubertal delay," the minor receives
treatments designed to suppress hormones, in effect delaying pu-
berty.3 4 This treatment is fully reversible, as it merely allows the minor
to delay the decision about whether to permanently transition until
the minor is older and can make a more informed decision. 35 In the
second stage, HBIGDA recommends hormone treatment to masculin-
ize or feminize the individual's body. This stage is partially reversible
and is not recommended before age sixteen. 36 The third stage, irre-
versible intervention, such as surgical procedures, is not recom-
29. Brent L. Bilodeau & Kristen A. Renn, Analysis of LGBT Identity Development Models
and Implications for Practice, 111 NEW DIRECTIONS STUDENT SERVS. 25, 29 (2005).
30. See, e.g., KennethJ. Zucker, Gender Identity Development and Issues, 13 CHILD & ADO-
LESCENT PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF N. Am. 551, 556 (2004).
31. Id. at 557.
32. See HARRY BENJAMIN INT'L GENDER DYSPHORiA ASS'N, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR GEN-
DER IDENTITY DISORDERS 8 (6th ed. 2001), available at http:// www.wpath.org/Documents
2/socv6.pdf [hereinafter STANDARDS OF CARE; Peggy T. Cohen-Kettenis et al., Sex Reassign-
ment of Adolescent Transsexuals: A Follow-Up Study, 36J. AM. AcAD. CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHI-
ATRY 263, 264 (1997).
33. STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 32, at 8.
34. Id. at 10.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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mended until the individual is over age eighteen. 37 This treatment
protocol includes adult guidance for the transgender minor.38 The
standards require giving the adolescent time to discuss his or her gen-
der identity with adult mental health professionals.3 9
A transgender minor's appearance is of the utmost importance to
healthy identity development. Studies show that allowing adolescents
to begin the gender transition process before reaching adulthood im-
proves their mental health. 40 While the effects of hormone treatment
designed to delay puberty are reversible and the effects of hormones
to masculinize or feminize the body are partially reversible, the effects
of allowing puberty to occur are often irreversible. 41 Therefore, an
adult who decides to transition after puberty may experience an infer-
ior transition. 42
Making the decision to delay puberty is one of the most impor-
tant decisions in a minor's life. This decision affects the minor's right
to assert control over her body in a fundamental-albeit, not perma-
nent-way. Under current law, this decision turns on whether the mi-
nor's parents consent to the procedure, even though it is the minor
who will suffer irreversible effects if there is no intervention. 43 A right
of access to courts would be invaluable to a minor making the deci-
sion to delay puberty (with the advice of a competent adult), as it
would allow her to challenge statutes, and ask for an injunction if her
parents denied her treatment.
It is important to recognize that not all transgender minors wish
to delay puberty. The costs of hormone treatment place the option
out of reach for most, and many individuals who identify as trans-
gender or gender variant have no desire to modify their bodies or take
37. Id. at 11.
38. See id. at 10.
39. Id.
40. See Cohen-Kettenis et al., supra note 32, at 264; Yolanda L.S. Smith et al., Adoles-
cents with Gender Identity Disorder Who Were Accepted or Rejected for Sex Reassignment Surgery: A
Prospective Follow-up Study, 40 J. Am. AcAD. CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 472, 479 (2001)
[hereinafter Smith et al., Gender Identity Disorder]; Sonja Shield, The Doctor Won't See You
Now: Rights of Transgender Minors to Sex Reassignment Treatment, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 361, 401 (2007) (citing Yolanda L.S. Smith et al., Postoperative Psychological Function-
ing of Adolescent Transsexuals: A Rorschach Study, 31 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 255, 256
(2002)).
41. See Cohen-Kettenis et al., supra note 32, at 264.
42. See id.; Shield, supra note 40, at 379 (citing Smith et al., Gender Identity Disorder,
supra note 40, at 472-73).
43. Shield, supra note 40, at 361-62.
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hormones. Nevertheless, a right of access to courts would be empow-
ering for many transgender minors.
Two common situations illustrate the importance of court access
rights for transgender minors. School dress codes often require trans-
gender minors to wear clothing for the gender opposite which they
identify, a situation likely to cause severe emotional distress. A minor
in this situation would have no recourse if her parents opposed her
gender expression. 44 Similarly, a minor wishing to use a bathroom in
school other than the bathroom "assigned" to her biological gender
may face serious obstacles from an unwilling administration. For these
reasons, as well as the reasons discussed relative to lesbian and gay
minors, transgender minors will benefit from a right of access to
courts.
D. LGBT Minors and Identity Development
Sections A, B, and C of Part I share a common thread: they in-
volve minors seeking a safe place to explore and develop their identi-
ties. The importance of identity development is not unique to LGBT
minors, nor are they the only ones who benefit from being able to
explore the possibility of an LGBT identity.45 Indeed, social science
shows that exploration is an important part of identity development. 4 6
Especially for teens who are exploring LGBT identities, the ability to
decide whom to disclose these potential identities to is crucial. 47 The
fact that a teen may choose to disclose to her peers or to other adults
rather than to her parents is a normal part of development. 48 Being
able to disclose one's identity to a supportive group has documented
benefits for all teens, but especially for LGBT teens. 49 As the law cur-
rently stands, however, many states unwittingly block minors from the
processes that would allow them to vindicate important identity-re-
lated rights.
44. See infta Part III (discussing results of fifty-state survey).
45. See RITCH SAVIN-WILLIAMS, THE NEW GAY TEENAGER 74-76 (2005) (discussing the
fluidity of sexuality). Indeed, many minors who will grow up to identify as straight or to
identify outside of conventional labels may still experiment with these identities. Id.
46. See Holning Lau, Pluralism: A Principle for Children's Rights, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L.
REv. 317, 331 (2007) (discussing identify formation as a function of social processes).
47. Id. at 332.
48. Ruthellen Josselson, Ego Development in Adolescence, in HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENrT
PSYCHOLOGY 188, 194 (Joseph Adelson ed., 1980).
49. See Richard R. Troiden, Homosexual Identity Development, 9 J. ADoLEScENT HEALTH
CARE 105, 110 (1988) (discussing in part the beneficial effect of disclosing sexual identity
to one's safe peer group).
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II. The Rights of Parents and the Rights of Their Children
The United States Supreme Court has spoken at length about the
constitutional rights of children and parents. The Court has held that
parents have an interest in the care, custody, and upbringing of their
children.50 Minors have constitutional rights, including the right to
free speech, 51 due process protections in criminal proceedings, 52 due
process proceedings against deprivations of property,53 and the right
to privacy, which encompasses the right to have an abortion.5 4 Still,
minors' constitutional rights may be limited in ways that the rights of
adults may not.55
Parents' rights and minors' rights sometimes conflict. The Court
has discussed this conflict, with various commentators reaching differ-
ent conclusions about how the Court is balancing rights. Arguments
for a broad zone of parental autonomy are based on the assumption
that minors have underdeveloped decisional capabilities and that par-
ents are in the best position to protect minors' interests.5 6 Other argu-
ments reference the parents' position as "head of the family," stating
that either because of the child's economic dependence on the par-
ents, or because of the underlying sanctity of the family, courts should
be reluctant to intervene.5 7 Under this view, children only have rights
against very egregious harm, such as child abuse or neglect. Other
commentators construe the cases more narrowly, arguing that the
Court's decisions only protect the rights of parents against the state.58
Some have taken a middle ground, arguing that even if the case law
once supported a broad right of parental autonomy, evolving norms
have changed the nature of the right.59
50. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
51. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
52. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967).
53. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).
54. Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti I), 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979).
55. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 541 (1971) (holding juveniles in juve-
nile criminal proceedings are not entitled to jury trial under the Sixth or Fourteenth
Amendments).
56. See Alison M. Brumley, Comment, Parental Control of a Minor's Right to Sue in Federal
Court, 58 U. CHi. L. REv. 333, 342 (1991) (categorizing arguments in favor of parental
control).
57. See id. (categorizing arguments in favor of parental control).
58. SeeJanet Dolgin, The Fate of Childhood: Legal Models of Children and the Parent-Child
Relationship, 61 ALB. L. Rav. 345, 383-87 (1997); Lawrence P. Wilkins, Children's Rights:
Removing the Parental Consent Barrier to Medical Treatment of Minors, 1975 Aiuz. ST. L.J. 31
(1975).
59. See Walter Wadlington, Medical Decision Making for and by Children: Tensions Between
Parent, State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 311, 318 (1994).
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Arguments for parental autonomy derive from a general interest
in the minor's well-being. The Court has never recognized an interest
in parental authority based solely on the minor's economic depen-
dence or familial sanctity, without also analyzing the minor's best in-
terests. The Court's jurisprudence consistently emphasizes the need
for minors to develop into mature adults, the need to protect minors
from harm, and the need to assist minors in decision-making. 60 The
Court privileges these concerns and the best interest of the child over
a stand-alone interest in parental authority.61
A. The Beginnings of the Court's Parent-Child Jurisprudence
In Meyer v. Nebraska,6 2 the Court found that a state could not pre-
vent a school from teaching German to its students. 63 In explaining its
reasoning, the Court stated that parents have the liberty to "establish a
home and bring up children."64 The Court admonished "legislative
action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some pur-
pose within the competency of the state to effect."65 Meanwhile, the
Court emphasized that learning German would not harm the
minors. 66
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,67 the Court again addressed the issue
of parental rights, this time finding unconstitutional a compulsory ed-
ucation law that would have prevented children from attending pri-
vate schools. 68 The Court again spoke of the right of parents to "direct
the upbringing and education of children under their control."69 The
Court added, "The child is not the mere creature of the State; those
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with
the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations." 70
From early on, the Court made clear that parental liberty inter-
ests in child rearing are not absolute. The Court held that states can
regulate and prohibit child labor,71 and can compel vaccination of a
60. See infra Part III.D.
61. See infra Part III.D.
62. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
63. Id. at 401.
64. Id. at 399.
65. Id. at 400.
66. Id. at 403.
67. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
68. Id. at 534-35.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 535.
71. Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320, 325 (1913).
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child, even if parents object on religious grounds. 72 For example,
Prince v. Massachusetts73 is one of the first cases limiting the rights of
parents. In Prince, the Court upheld a child labor law prohibiting a
child from distributing religious literature in the streets, even though
the child's parents supported the practice.7 4 The parents' argument
was based on an expansive reading of parental liberty.75 They argued
that "in a democracy the family is the primary force and the social-
izing agency through which the child acquires most of moral, social
and cultural values," and that the family and the home are fundamen-
tal institutions secured by the Bill of Rights. 76 Under the parents' the-
ory, courts would only be justified in intervening upon:
[A] positive showing that the parent's manner of exercising con-
trol over the child is an abuse which so greatly jeopardizes the wel-
fare of the child as to require intervention on the part of the State
to sever the relation between the guardian and child and declare
the child a ward of the state.77
Thus, the parents argued for a very broad right to parental authority
based on their inherent rights to raise a family.
Massachusetts argued for a more limited conception of parental
authority. 78 Under its view, since the Constitution protects only civil
rights, and since parental rights are natural, not civil, parental rights
are not protected by the Constitution. 79 Massachusetts argued that it is
within the State's power to limit the parents' interest in child rearing,
if doing so protects the child.8 0 Massachusetts's brief stated, "This
Court has repeatedly stated that all questions relative to the care, con-
trol and custody of minor children belong exclusively to the State."8 1
This is so even if it necessitates intrusion into the domain of parental
teachings, since:
[T]he courts of the several states are unanimous in holding that
state legislation for the protection of minor children, founded
upon the principle of the position of the state as parens patriae, is
72. SeeJacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 28-29, 38 (1905).
73. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
74. Id. at 170.
75. Appellant's Brief at *16-17, Prince. v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (No.
98), 1943 WAL 54417.
76. Id.
77. Id. at *19.
78. Brief on Behalf of the Appellee the Commonwealth of Massachusetts at *15,
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (No. 98), 1943 WL 54418.
79. Id. at "15-16.
80. Id. at *15.
81. Id. at *14 (citing Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Bailey v. Drexel
Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 527 (1925)).
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not an unconstitutional interference with the parent's freedom of
religion, even though such legislation runs contra to a particular
parent's religious beliefs. 82
Under this view, the only thing that matters is the best interest of the
child.
Although the Court did not discuss the natural-rights and civil-
rights distinction, it sided with Massachusetts in its decision. The
Court enshrined into law the idea that parental liberties may yield
where there is potential harm to the child, even where this harm is
less severe than that typically at issue in abuse and neglect cases. The
Court spoke of a need to balance "freedom of conscience and relig-
ious practice," and with it, "the parent's claim to authority in her own
household and in the rearing of her children" against "the interest of
youth itself, and of the whole community, that children be both safe-
guarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and
independent well-developed men and citizens."8' 3 In the end, the
Court privileged the latter, finding the ordinance constitutional and
noting that the state's duty to protect children extends into "matters
of conscience and religious conviction."8 4 The Court emphasized that
"[tlhe state's authority over children's activities is broader than over
like actions of adults .... A democratic society rests, for its continu-
ance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into
full maturity as citizens, with all that implies."
85
The parental liberty described in early cases derives primarily
from a natural-rights perspective of the family. Parents are granted the
right to care for their children as they see fit because of the family's
inherent sanctity. The family is protected because of its vital role in
child-rearing, because parents often know what is best for their chil-
dren, and because the family is primarily where child education and
growth occur. There is a certain reasonableness to these natural law
arguments. The family has been one of society's most important insti-
tutions for thousands of years. Most parents act in the best interests of
their children, and it is hard to picture a society without parents teach-
ing their children important values. Still, even in these cases, the
Court recognizes that the rights of parents are not absolute and that
while parents often act in their children's best interests, there are
times when parents are misguided. Where parents' actions are harm-
82. Brief on Behalf of the Appellee the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, supra note
78, at *17.
83. Prince, 321 U.S. at 165.
84. Id. at 167.
85. Id. at 168.
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ing their children, parents have always been prevented from using
their beliefs as a shield. Parents have the liberty to raise their children
as they see fit, provided their practices do not cause harm to their
children or to others.
B. Wisconsin v. Yoder
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court decided Wisconsin v.
Yoder,86 which revisited the issues discussed in earlier cases. In Yoder,
the Court found that Wisconsin's compulsory education law unconsti-
tutionally burdened the Amish by forcing minors to attend school un-
til they turned sixteen years old.8 7 The Court held that parents have
the right to direct the care and upbringing of their children. Yoder is
often cited as an important case in the Court's parent-child jurispru-
dence; however, it is not a case about conflicting rights between par-
ents and children. Instead, the parties devoted much of their
argument to the First Amendment.88 Even the parents' brief barely
mentions the right to rear children.89 The Supreme Court empha-
sized this was not a situation where the rights of parents and children
conflicted, and that a different outcome may have been appropriate
had the children wished to attend secondary school. 90 That Yoder is
primarily a free exercise case, not a case suggesting a new, broader
theory of parental rights, explains Yoder's narrow holding.
Moreover, the case can be read to highlight the earlier cases' fo-
cus on preventing harm. The Court stated that parental power can be
limited where it "jeopardize[s] the health or safety of the child, or
ha[s] a potential for significant social burdens."91 Yoder explained that
forcing children to attend secondary school would cause them harm,
but allowing them to stop after eighth grade would not. This is largely
because Amish practices lead children to develop into mature
adults. 92 For example, the Court emphasized that Amish children are
adequately prepared for life as Amish adults, and that the Amish are a
highly successful, self-sufficient unit of society.93 The Court stated that
these adolescents will be prepared for adulthood even if they leave
86. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
87. Id. at 234.
88. Id. at 232-34.
89. Brief for Respondents at *42-43, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1971) (No. 70-
110), 1971 WL 126408.
90. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 231-32.
91. Id. at 234.
92. Id. at 232.
93. Id. at 222.
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Amish society, noting that the Amish provide "'ideal' vocational edu-
cation," and that "[t]here is nothing in this record to suggest that the
Amish qualities of reliability, self-reliance, and dedication to work
would fail to find ready markets in today's society."94 Thus, the deci-
sion focused on protecting adolescents' mental health and ability to
develop; it just happened that siding with the parents was the way to
protect these adolescents.
To the extent the Court defers to parents' rights, it does so be-
cause it is confident that the children's best interests are protected. In
Yoder, this confidence was reasonable, as it was based on extensive tes-
timony about the Amish system of education and its positive effects,
and on the testimony of one child concerning her desire to leave
school and join the Amish community. 95 The case suggests that where
the interests of parents and children are aligned and the child is not
harmed, the Court will not substitute its decision for that of the
parents.
As Justice Douglas's dissent emphasized, however, Yoder is not a
blanket endorsement of parental authority in situations where the in-
terests of the parent and the minor child are at odds and the minor
can show she will be harmed by parental deference. Justice Douglas
dissented because he questioned the Court's decision to ignore the
desires of the Amish children. Thus, Justice Douglas stressed the cen-
trality of the courtroom as potentially the sole forum for hearing the
minor's voice. "As the child has no other effective forum, it is in this
litigation that his rights should be considered." 96
Justice Douglas argued the Court should consider the minors'
views and potentially privilege them over their parents' views. 97 The
majority in no way altered the contours of the minor's right; they only
disagreed with Douglas as to whether the minors should have had in-
put in the education decision, and whether that lack of input caused
them harm. Yoder does not preclude the cases of an Amish child who
affirmatively expresses a desire to leave the Amish community, nor an
openly gay Amish child who can show "great psychological harm"98 if
forced to withdraw from public school.
94. Id. at 224.
95. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 89, at *20.
96. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
97. See id.
98. Id. at 212 (noting that experts stated compulsory high school education could
result in "great psychological harm to Amish children").
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C. The Abortion Cases
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,99 the Court directly considered
what happens when a parent's rights conflict with her child's constitu-
tional rights. 10 0 In Danforth, the Court found a blanket parental con-
sent requirement for minors seeking abortions to be unconstitutional,
and one which did not contain ajudicial bypass option. 10 1 The Court
noted, "Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being mag-
ically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority," 10 2 and
"the State does not have the constitutional authority to give a third
party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the
physician and his patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy, regard-
less of the reason for withholding the consent."1 0 3 While stating that
parents have an interest in such authority, the Court questioned
whether allowing a parental veto would in any way strengthen the fam-
ily structure, and emphasized that "[any independent interest the
parent may have in the termination of the minor daughter's preg-
nancy is no more weighty than the right of privacy of the competent
minor mature enough to have become pregnant."1 0 4 Thus, in Danforth
the minor's rights took precedence over the parent's.
In Bellotti v. Baird ("Bellotti If'),105 the statute at issue provided a
judicial bypass for minors seeking an abortion without parental con-
sent, but required parental notice for minors using the bypass. In find-
ing the notice provision unconstitutional, the Court again weighed
the respective interests of parent and child: "[w]e have recognized
three reasons justifying the conclusion that the constitutional rights of
children cannot be equated with those of adults: the peculiar vulnera-
bility of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an in-
formed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in
child rearing. '"106
The first two of these considerations are straightforward-both
the peculiar vulnerability of children and their inability to make criti-
cal decisions suggest the Court's desire to protect minors from harm.
At first glance, the third is relatively more controversial; perhaps the
importance of the parental role in childrearing suggests a decision to
99. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
100. Id. at 52-53, 74.
101. See id. at 74-75.
102. Id. at 74.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 75.
105. Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti I1), 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
106. Id. at 634.
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privilege the parent's rights over the child's. However, the Court lists
two reasons for deferring to parental control. First, it states that "l[t] he
State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action
and from their own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or
involvement in important decisions by minors." 10 7 This is an extension
of the principle that minors may not always make the best decisions.
By requiring parental consent, the state ensures that minors will con-
sult an adult before making important decisions.
The Court's second justification is more directly connected to the
traditional idea of parental authority. The Court quoted Pierce and
Yoder for the idea that a child must be taught moral standards and
religious beliefs.108 The Court reasoned that "[t]his affirmative pro-
cess of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and example is
essential to the growth of young people into mature, socially responsi-
ble citizens." 10 9 At first blush, this appears to give parents wide latitude
in making decisions on behalf of their children. The Court presumed,
however, that no harm flows from this authority. Instead, parental au-
thority is listed as "important to the child's chances for the full growth
and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society mean-
ingful and rewarding."' 10 Where that authority instead prevents this
growth, parents are not entitled to deference.
In Bellotti II, the Court explicitly attempted to protect minors
from harm. The Court mentioned "the unique nature and conse-
quences of the abortion decision," and found these make an absolute
parental veto of the abortion decision inappropriate.111 The Court
mandated:
[I]f the State decides to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or
both parents' consent to an abortion, it also must provide an alter-
native procedure whereby authorization for the abortion can be
obtained.
A pregnant minor is entitled in such a proceeding to show either:
(1) that she is mature enough and well enough informed to make
her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician, indepen-
dently of her parents' wishes; or (2) that even if she is not able to
make this decision independently, the desired abortion would be
in her best interests.11 2
107. Id. at 637.
108. Id. at 637-38.
109. Id. at 638.
110. Id. at 638-39.
111. Id. at643.
112. Id. at 643-44 (footnote omitted).
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The Court commands parental authority yield to the minor's will
where the minor proves capable to make the decision on her own or
where the minor can show that the exercise of parental authority in-
herent in obtaining parental notice/consent would not be in her best
interest. Although the Court grounds its decision in the uniqueness of
the abortion decision, Bellotti II is thematically similar to the other
cases that recognize an interest in parental authority where conducive
to mature development, but limited it where it poses harm to the
minor.
Following Belotti II, the Court again faced an abortion-related
clash between minors' rights and parental rights in Hodgson v. Minne-
sota.1 3 This time, the Court struck down a statute mandating a minor
notify both parents of an abortion decision." 4 The Court found that
states can require a minor notify both parents, as long as the statute
contains a judicial bypass option.' 15 The Court emphasized that pa-
rental consent requirements are designed to assist the minor in mak-
ing difficult decisions: "The State has a strong and legitimate interest
in the welfare of its young citizens, whose immaturity, inexperience,
and lack of judgment may sometimes impair their ability to exercise
their rights wisely."' 1 6 The language of Hodgson appears to foreclose
any arguments that parents have an independent right of parental au-
thority. The Court spoke strongly about weighing parents' rights
against the child's: "Indeed, the constitutional defects that Justice
Powell identified in the statute [(at issue in Hodgson)] . . . are predi-
cated on the assumption that the justification for any rule requiring
parental involvement in the abortion decision rests entirely on the best
interests of the child."117 Thus, parental involvement is encouraged when
minors face difficult decisions. Parental involvement will often assist
the minor in making these decisions, and can help the minor grow
into a mature, independent adult. When parental involvement harms
the child, however, the parent will not receive deference, even if the
parent has a strong conviction that something is "right" for her child.
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,'18 the Supreme Court briefly revis-
ited the issue of a parental notice provision, upholding the part of
Pennsylvania's abortion statute that required either informed parental
113. 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
114. Id. at 422-23 (striking down subdivision two of MINN. STAT. § 144.343 (1988)).
115. Id. at 455.
116. Id. at 444.
117. Id. at 453-54 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
118. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Spring 2009]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
consent or judicial bypass. Although some of the briefs in Casey ar-
gued about the increased burden these requirements would have on
minors, the Court did not directly address these concerns. 11 9 Instead,
the Court wrote a short section affirming its earlier cases upholding
notification statutes as long as they contain judicial bypass provi-
sions.'12 The Court did not find the informed consent part of the stat-
ute problematic:
[S]ome of the provisions regarding informed consent have particu-
lar force with respect to minors: the waiting period, for example,
may provide the parent or parents of a pregnant young woman the
opportunity to consult with her in private, and to discuss the conse-
quences of her decision in the context of the values and moral or
religious principles of their family.121
One might question the Court's willingness to ignore social science
evidence. In spite of this, the Court has still shown that it will defer to
parental authority when in the best interests of the minor, but will
intervene when the parents fail to act in the minor's best interests.1 22
D. Other Cases
The Supreme Court has also touched upon the scope of a par-
ent's right to rear children in a few other situations, most recently in
Troxel v. Granville.123 While the Court used sweeping language to de-
scribe this right, none of these cases contradict the basic principle that
a child's best interest is superior to the parent's right to rear the child
as the parent sees fit. In Troxel, the Court stated that "[t]he liberty
interest at issue in this case-the interest of parents in the care, cus-
tody, and control of their children-is perhaps the oldest of the fun-
damental liberty interests recognized by this Court."124 Still, the Court
criticized Washington's statute for not requiring a showing of harm,
and left open the possibility of other, more circumspect visitation stat-
utes being upheld.1 25 Similarly, in Parham v. J.R,1 26 the Court allowed
119. See Brief of Amici Curiae of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc., and Other Organizations, in Support of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania at *24-25, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Nos. 91-744 & 91-902), 1992 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 289.
120. Casey, 505 U.S. at 899.
121. Id. at 899-900.
122. For example, the statute in this case mandated that parents must act in the best
interests of their minor child when considering the abortion decision. See 18 PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 3206(a) (2007) ("In deciding whether to grant... consent, a... parent... shall con-
sider only their child's .. .best interests." (emphasis added)).
123. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
124. Id. at 65.
125. Id. at 63.
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great deference to a parent's decision to commit a child to a mental
hospital. However, the Court based this deference on the premise that
parents generally act in their children's best interests.127 The Court
was comfortable making this presumption because of the many insti-
tutional safeguards already present. For example, formal court hear-
ings were required before a child could be admitted to a mental
hospital. 128
While the Court may sometimes use sweeping rhetoric in describ-
ing parents' rights to raise children, this rhetoric should not be read
broadly. Although parents have the right to be free from government
interference and are often be presumed to act in the best interests of
their children, these rights have limits.129 Where a child is old enough
to voice her own opinion and can show the capability to make mature,
intelligent decisions, the presumption in favor of the parent is at its
weakest. There is no reason for a court to favor parent's rights over
the child's, especially if the parental action is not in the child's best
interest. In these situations, the Court has instead privileged the
child's rights.
E. Conclusions
As illustrated above, a variety of interests are at stake, for both
parents and their minor children. Parents have an interest in teaching
their children beliefs and values and ensuring that they grow into ma-
ture citizens. The reasons the Court may wish to protect these inter-
ests range from natural law views of the family to the practical fact that
parents are often best situated to teach important lessons. This is emi-
nently plausible, as public policy discourages courts from intervening
in private matters, especially when it is unknown if the court's judg-
ment is any better than the parental judgment. As argued later in Part
V, social science evidence supports the assertion that minors benefit
from the involvement of an adult in the decision-making process.
Thus, there are many sound reasons for deferring to parental rights,
and in most cases, it is likely courts will continue to do so.
The Court's jurisprudence has also consistently shown, however,
that parental rights are not absolute. The Court has spoken at length
126. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
127. Id. at 602 ("More important, historically [the law] has recognized that natural
bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.").
128. Id. at 606-07.
129. See id. (discussing a "neutral factfinder['s]" investigation into whether require-
ments for admission are satisfied (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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about the parens patriae obligation to the child (i.e., the courts' obli-
gation to protect minors from harm). 130 In the most egregious situa-
tions-cases of abuse and neglect-courts have always privileged
minors' rights over their parents' rights. 13 1 And, even in less egregious
situations, the Court has frequently recognized the state's right to pro-
tect minors' well-being. 13 2 Thus, in Prince, the Court upheld an ordi-
nance preventing a child from distributing literature in the street,
despite the fact that there was no showing of actual harm to the
child.133 In Yoder, the Court suggested an interest in protecting mi-
nors, even where the harm faced by the minor is primarily psychologi-
cal.134 In the abortion cases, the Court relied on the principle that
minors have constitutional interests, and that, where the rights of par-
ents and their minor children conflict, the best interest of the child
should control. 135 Together, these cases suggest that, while important,
parental interests must be understood in terms of their effect on the
child. Courts should defer to parents when they appear to represent
the best interests of the child, but take action to protect the child
when they do not.
III. State Procedural Statutes and Case Law
A. Introduction
State statutes and cases provide a context for how the constitu-
tional conflict discussed in Part II has been interpreted on a state
level. This Article conducts and analyzes a fifty-state survey of state law
issues affecting whether a minor could get into court without parental
notification or consent. The results of the survey are summarized in
Table 1. The analysis compares state equivalents of Rule 17(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that a minor cannot
appear in court unless represented by a guardian ad litem. Every state
except Indiana has either incorporated Rule 17(c) into its civil proce-
dure code or has a similar rule requiring a minor appear by guardian
ad litem or next friend. The state procedural rules are listed in Table
1, Column 2 ("Source of Rule").
In addition to equivalents of Rule 17(c), thirty states have gone
further, crafting specific requirements for how a guardian ad litem/
130. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 148, 166-67 (1944).
131. See Parnham, 442 U.S. at 602.
132. Prince, 321 U.S. at 168-69.
133. Id. at 170-71.
134. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 212 (1972).
135. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895, 899 (1992).
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next friend is to be chosen for a minor. The statutes are listed in Ta-
ble 1, Column 3 ("Specific Guidelines for Appointment"). In the stat-
utes specifying procedures for the appointment of a guardian ad
litem, eighteen states also distinguish minors age fourteen or older.
Also, Arizona does not have a specific rule for appointing a guardian
ad litem, but does distinguish minors over fourteen in its law on trusts
and estates. Drawing a line at age fourteen suggests that these legisla-
tures are more confident in the decision-making capability of minors
over age fourteen. Table 1, Column 4 ("Distinction for People over
Fourteen") lists whether each state has such a distinction.
This Article also examines state constitutions, identifying states
with an explicit right of access to the courts, and those that have case
law explicitly extending that right to minors. Thirty-eight states have
such a right, and five have explicitly extended it to minors. If a state
has an explicit right of access to courts, then minors have stronger
claims for judicial access, because minors can argue that their state
constitutional rights are being abridged. Whether a state has an ex-
plicit right of access to the courts and where in the state constitution it
can be found is listed in Table 1, Column 5 ("Right of Access to
Court").
Next, this Article analyzes state statutes to compare which states
require parental notice/consent before a minor can obtain an abor-
tion and, if so, discusses the text of its judicial bypass statute. Thirty-
seven states require parental notice/consent; thirteen do not. The
state judicial bypass statutes are important as they show how to craft a
bypass. Additionally, in the thirteen states that do not require parental
notice/consent for abortions, minors can argue that the same reason-
ing should apply to their petitions for appointment of guardians ad
litem. The results of this search and location of state judicial bypass
statutes are in Table 1, Column 6 ('judicial Bypass Statute").
Finally, this Article discusses federal and state law cases address-
ing the conflict between parent's rights and their children's rights in
the context of bringing lawsuits and appearing in court. Twenty-four
states have relevant case law, revealing how state courts have resolved
conflicts between parents and their minor children.
B. Rule 17 (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 17(c) states:
(1) With a Representative. The following representatives may sue
or defend on behalf of a minor or incompetent person: (A) a gen-
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eral guardian; (B) a committee; (C) a conservator; or (D) a like
fiduciary.
(2) Without a Representative. A minor or an incompetent person
who does not have a duly appointed representative may sue by a
next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court must appoint a
guardian ad litem-or issue another appropriate order-to protect
a minor or incompetent person who is unrepresented in an
action. 136
This rule is used to provide protection for minors, as well as in-
fants. Although parents are often appointed to represent their chil-
dren, "[no] parent [ ] may claim to be a guardian ad litem of his
minor child as a matter of right." 137
Interestingly, neither the advisory committee notes to Rule 17(c)
nor various commentaries on the rule address the issue of conflict
between a minor and a parent. 138 This may be because the specific
interpretations of the rule are left to the states, or it may be because
the drafters and commentators only contemplated the usual situation
where the interests of parent and child align. Commentaries focus on
the proper plaintiff to represent a minor in the common situation
where a minor's parent seeks to vindicate her child's tort claim. How-
ever, these commentaries ignore situations where minors wish to
bring civil rights lawsuits without parental notice or consent. Still, the
language of Rule 17(c) and subsequent interpretations is consistent
with the notion that the minor's rights are to be favored in the con-
flict between a minor and her parents. For example, while the rule
explicitly protects minors, it does not mention parents. In stating that
guardians ad litem are to be appointed where direct conflict exists
between the minor and her parent, courts have affirmed that the
court's job is to protect the best interest of the child, not to defer to
her parents' authority.
C. State Statutes
The specific requirements for a guardian ad litem are a matter of
state law. 139 Since states are free to craft their own rules about the
136. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c).
137. Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338, 1352 (11 th Cir. 2000) (quoting Fong Sik Leung
v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 74, 82 (9th Cir.1955)).
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c) note.
139. Ins. Co. v. Bangs, 103 U.S. 435, 438 (1881) ("It is the State and not the Federal
government, except in the Territories and the District of Columbia, which stands, with
reference to the persons and property of infants, in the situation of parens patriae. Accord-
ingly provision is made by law in all the States for the appointment of such guardians,
whose duties and powers are carefully defined.").
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appointment of guardians, this Article examines state rules of civil
procedure. The results of this search, along with relevant quotations
from the statutes, are located in Table 2. Specifically, this Article looks
at what the state rule is, where it can be found, whether it is a variant
of Rule 17(c), and, if so, whether the state expanded Rule 17(c). 140
Twenty-eight states have adopted Rule 17(c) or a slight variant as their
state rule of civil procedure, and twelve of these states have added
their own provisions for the appointment of a guardian ad litem.
Twenty-two state statutes contain language different from Rule 17(c)
and are coded in Table 1 as non-Rule 17(c) states; thirteen of these
state statutes include specific provisions for the appointment of a
guardian ad litem.
Rule 17(c) does not address how to appoint a guardian ad litem
or whether parental consent/notice is required for the appointment
of a guardian; the sixteen states which do not go further than Rule
17(c) are also inconclusive. Similarly, nine of the twenty-two Rule
17(c) equivalent states have provisions which, though using different
language, are substantively similar to Rule 17(c) and are also incon-
clusive. For these twenty-five states, statutes and rules of civil proce-
dure fail to provide guidance as to whether a minor may bring a
lawsuit without parental notice/consent.
The other twenty-five states are more specific about the require-
ments for appointing guardians ad litem, and are often more specific
concerning issues of notice and consent. These states can be sepa-
rated into four categories: states explicitly allowing minors over age
fourteen to bring lawsuits without parental notice/consent ("Category
1"), states that draw a line at age fourteen but that do not specifically
discuss the issue of notice or consent ("Category 2"), states explicitly
prohibiting minors from bringing lawsuits without parental notice/
consent ("Category 3"), and states that have more specific rules but do
not address age or notice and consent ("Category 4").
1. Category 1 States: Minors Explicitly Allowed to Bring Lawsuits
Without Parental Notice/Consent
Six states fit into Category 1. In these states, the language of the
procedural rules suggests that minors may petition for the appoint-
ment of guardians ad litem without parental notice, as long as they are
over age fourteen.14 1 For example, Minnesota's rule states that a mi-
140. In the Appendix infra tbl.1, these states are listed as Y+.
141. However, the fact that a law is written in a way that suggests this result does not
mean courts will actually allow minors to bring claims without parental notice.
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nor over the age of fourteen may apply for the appointment of a
guardian ad litem, and if the appointment is applied for by the minor,
the court may hear the application with or without parental notice. 1 42
Missouri, North Dakota, and South Carolina, have similar provi-
sions.143 Connecticut provides that "[a] ny appointment of a guardian
ad litem may be made with or without notice." 144 Although the statute
does not specify whether it refers to parental notice or some other
form of notice, this language suggests a minor can argue for the court
to appoint a guardian absent parental notice.
In these states, legislatures seemingly decided that minors over
age fourteen are capable of decisions concerning their representa-
tion, without their parent's involvement. Perhaps the legislatures real-
ized that adult involvement in the case is inherent (since the guardian
will be an adult), and trust that this, combined with a minor's deci-
sional capacity, will sufficiently safeguard the minor's best interests.
2. Category 2 States: Drawing Some Distinction at Age Fourteen
Twelve states fit into Category 2. These states draw a distinction
for minors over age fourteen; however, they do not explicitly state
how this distinction affects issues of notice or consent. For example,
Tennessee law states that the court may waive the appointment of a
guardian ad litem if the petitioner for the appointment is a minor
over age fourteen. 145 Alabama, California, Montana, Michigan, Ne-
vada, Oregon, Utah, and Washington provide that a guardian ad litem
may be appointed upon the application of a minor if the minor is over
age fourteen. 146 Arizona and Delaware have similar provisions, though
they are located in state code sections on the appointment of a testa-
mentary guardian. 147 Pennsylvania code contains a provision for dece-
dents stating that a person nominated by a minor over age fourteen
shall be preferred as guardian of her person. 148 These states recognize
the increased decision-making capacity of minors over age fourteen
142. MINN. R. Civ. P. 17.02.
143. See Mo REv. STAT. § 507.130 (2003); N.D. CEr. CODE § 28-03-01 (2006); S.C. R.
Civ. P. 17(d) (1976).
144. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-132(d) (2004).
145. TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1-107(2)(B) (2007).
146. ALA. R. Civ. P. 17(d); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 373(a) (West 2004); MICH. R. CT.
2.201(E)(2)(i); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-5-301(2) (2007); NEV. REv. STAT. § 12.050(2)
(2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 27(a)(1) (2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17(c)(1) (2008); WASH. RV.
CODE ANN. § 4.08.050(2) (2005).
147. ARZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-5204 (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3902(c)-(e)
(2001).
148. 20 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 5113 (West 2005).
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and suggest that courts must recognize the minor's chosen
representative.
3. Category 3 States: Explicitly Preventing Minors from Bringing
Suits Without Parental Notice/Consent
Three states fit in Category 3. These states prevent minors from
bringing lawsuits without parental notice/consent. Louisiana law
states that "[t]he father ... is the proper plaintiff to sue to enforce a
right of an unemancipated minor who is the legitimate issue of living
parents who are not divorced or judicially separated."1 49 The law also
states the mother is the proper plaintiff where the father is unable to
bring suit. 150 The statute further states "[u] pon application of the tu-
tor or parent who would otherwise be the proper plaintiff to
sue.., the court shall appoint or substitute as the proper plaintiff the
best qualified among the tutor, parent, or appointed attorney."' 51
Consequently, there is a small possibility Louisiana would allow suit by
a minor.
Maryland law notes:
When a minor is in the sole custody of one of its parents, that par-
ent has the exclusive right to sue on behalf of the minor for a pe-
riod of one year following the accrual of the cause of action, and if
the custodial parent fails to institute suit within the one year pe-
riod, any person interested in the minor shall have the right to
institute suit on behalf of the minor as next friend upon first mail-
ing notice to the last known address of the custodial parent. 152
Maryland law thus explicitly prevents a minor from bringing suit with-
out parental notice. Still, consent remains an open question, and it
may be that a minor may bring suit without parental consent, if the
parent is given proper notice.
New York law draws a distinction at age fourteen, allowing a mi-
nor over fourteen to move for the appointment of a guardian ad li-
tem. 153 However, it also provides that "[n]otice of a motion for
appointment of a guardian ad litem for a person shall be served upon
the guardian of his property . . .or if he has no such guardian ...
upon the person with whom he resides. ' 15 4 New York therefore seems
to preclude cases without parental notice, although not necessarily
149. LA. CODE CiV. PRoc. ANN. art. 683(C) (1999). Although outside the scope of this
Article, this statute appears to represent unconstitutional gender discrimination.
150. Id.
151. Id. art. 683(D).
152. MD. R. Crv. P. 2-202(b).
153. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1202(a) (Consol. 1997).
154. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1202(b).
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cases without parental consent. Still, the wording of this provision sug-
gests that it developed as a means of protecting minors' interests. The
court requires that an adult close to the minor be aware of the mo-
tion, which ensures the minor's ability to contest the motion.1 5 Thus,
it may be that the rule simply was not designed to deal with the con-
texts discussed in this Article.
The constitutionality of these state statutes is not clear. They ef-
fectively provide parents with an absolute veto over their children's
rights of access to courts. This is true even where going to court may
be in the best interest of the child. The case for minors is especially
strong in Louisiana and Maryland, where state constitutions grant
rights of access to courts (Maryland's constitution has even been ex-
plicitly extended to minors). Allowing parents to deny their minor
children access to the courts seems contrary to the language of the
decisions discussed later in section D.
4. Category 4 States: More Specific Rules for the Appointment of
a Guardian Ad Litem
Six states fit in category four. These states have more specific
rules for the appointment of a guardian ad litem, but do not address
the issues of parental notice or consent. These states are Arkansas,
Idaho, Maine, Mississippi, NewJersey, and Virginia.156 Although these
states have more detailed rules than Rule 17(c), these rules do not
shed any light on the question of whether a minor may seek the ap-
pointment of a guardian ad litem or sue without parental notice/con-
sent, nor do they draw any age-specific lines.
5. Conclusions
When all of these rules are considered together, an interesting
trend emerges: twenty-nine states do not address the issue of parental
notice/consent. Of the twenty-one that address notice/consent, only
three explicitly require parental notice/consent. 157 The remaining
eighteen draw a line respecting the increased capacity of minors over
age fourteen, with six explicitly permitting minors to petition for
guardians ad litem without parental notice/consent. Where states
155. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1202 note (Legislative Studies and Reports)
156. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-61-103 (2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-306 (2007); ME. R.
GUARDIAN AD LilEM II (2001); ME. R. Crv. P. 17(b) (2006); NJ. CT. R. 4:26-2(b) (2007); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-9 (2007).
157. States that do this do so because of their belief that the parent has internalized
the minor's best interest. For more on this, see discussion infra Part III.D.4.
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have chosen to address this issue, they have overwhelmingly come
down on the side of recognizing the increased maturity and decisional
capacity of minors over age fourteen. This strongly suggests that states
are attempting to protect minors through guardian ad litem
requirements.
D. Case Law
In addition to state statutes, both state and federal case law is use-
ful evidence of how courts interpret Rule 17(c) and the state statutes
concerning minors' procedural rights. Some cases directly address the
issue of a minor attempting to get into court without parental con-
sent. Outside the abortion context, most states have not ruled on this
issue. Still, the Eighth Circuit, Michigan, and Missouri have explicitly
held in favor of minors attempting to bring suit without parental con-
sent/notice, and Colorado allows minors to waive the guardian ad li-
tem requirement. In addition, many state cases discuss minors' rights
to court access, stating the principle that parents cannot extinguish a
minor's legal claims. Taken together, these cases suggest that minors
may be able to bring cases without parental notice/consent. On the
other end of the spectrum are cases emphasizing the parental right to
rear children. In these states, it is harder to argue that a minor should
have judicial access without parental notice/consent.
1. Cases Directly Allowing Minors to Go to Court Without Parental
Notice/Consent
In M.S. v. Wermers,158 a minor seeking access to contraceptives ap-
pealed an order dismissing the suit because of the minor's refusal to
give her parents notice of a pending proceeding for appointment of a
guardian ad litem. 159 The Eighth Circuit found in favor of the minor,
noting, "Since it would be inappropriate to appoint the parents in this
case, it was equally inappropriate and unnecessary to condition the
further progress of the lawsuit upon notification to the parents of the
hearing on the appointment. 1 60 The court worried that requiring pa-
rental notice would have "an obvious chilling effect upon appellant's
efforts to vindicate her constitutional rights."161 Here, the court ech-
oes Danforth's concern about allowing parents to veto their children's
158. 557 F.2d 170 (8th Cir. 1977).
159. Id. at 173.
160. Id. at 176.
161. Id.
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exercise of constitutional rights. 162 As a result, in the Eighth Circuit
minors have the right to petition for guardians ad litem without pa-
rental notice or consent. However, the court limited its holding to the
stage of petitioning for a guardian ad litem, and did not rule on
whether a minor could proceed with an entire lawsuit without paren-
tal notice or consent. 163
Michigan law also provides precedent for a minor who seeks to go
to court without parental notice or consent. In Buckholz v. Leveille,164 a
minor sought, contrary to his parents' wishes, to bring a suit challeng-
ing a high school dress code regulation. 165 The court emphasized the
need for courts to be open to all citizens,1 66 and found the sixteen-
year-old plaintiff had the right to bring a lawsuit in his own name,
against the wishes of his parents. 16 7 In its opinion, the court empha-
sized the distinction drawn by the legislature in permitting minors
over age fourteen to petition for their own guardians:
The rule makes a distinction between minors over the age of 14
years and minors under the age of 14 years and incompetents.
While minors under the age of 14 and incompetents must have
their next friend nominated by a relative or friend, minors over the
age of 14 may nominate their own next friend. The differentiation
between the two classes evidences a recognition on the part of the
drafters of the rule that minors over the age of 14 years are suffi-
ciently mature to exercise a greater degree of control over the
prosecution or defense of the case.
It is the opinion of this Court that the above-cited sections of GCR
1963, 201, evidence a clear intention to allow minor children 14
years of age or over, who have a duly-appointed next friend, to
institute and prosecute suits in this state absent any consent by, and
in fact contrary to the wishes of, the minor's parents.' 68
The court found the only situation requiring consent is one "so
peculiar to parental control that their consent is necessary," but did
not give any examples of such a situation. 169 Since the parents in Buch-
o/z knew about the case, Bucholz is limited only to the issue of consent
and does not touch the issue of notice. Interestingly, however, the
court allowed the minor to proceed in his own name.17 0 Grounded in
162. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
163. Wermers, 557 F.2d at 176.
164. 194 N.W.2d 427 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
165. Id. at 428.
166. Id. at 427.
167. Id. at 429.
168. Id. at 428-29.
169. Id. at 429.
170. Id. at 428.
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its appreciation of the minor's maturity, one reading of the decision is
that the court was sufficiently convinced of the minor's ability to make
his own decision without adult involvement. Another interpretation is
that the court was reassured because the minor would still have an
adult, his attorney, consulting with him and assisting him in his deci-
sion-making. Either way, Bucholz is important precedent, as minor
plaintiffs in other states can argue by analogy to Michigan that they
too should be able to bring cases without parental consent.
Missouri courts have also interpreted its state civil procedure rule
to afford more rights to minors over age fourteen. In Strahler v. St.
Luke's Hospital,171 the court found Missouri Civil Procedure Rule
52.02(c) did not relieve the disability of minority. Nonetheless, the
rule means that "in the case of a minor who is fourteen or older, ap-
pointment of a next friend can be made without notice to the persons
with whom the minor resides, and it can be accomplished without for-
mal application to the court."1 72 Since Strahler dealt with a two year
statute of limitations rather than a minor's petition to bring suit with-
out parental notice or consent, it did not address the issue in the same
manner as Bucholz and Wermers. Still, Strahler suggests that minors over
age fourteen can make decisions concerning who should represent
them and petition for the appointment of guardians ad litem without
parental notice.
Colorado has also ruled on the ability of a minor over age four-
teen to gain access to court. In Foe v. Vanderhoof 173 a minor sought to
bring an action challenging Colorado's parental consent to abortion
act.174 The minor had attorneys and the court found they were suffi-
cient to protect her interests:
We conclude that plaintiff's interests were sufficiently protected by
her attorneys and social worker in this matter so as to obviate the
necessity of appointment of a guardian to represent her. She has
evidenced understanding of the legal and personal implications of
this action and is capable of bringing the action on her own
behalf.175
The court looked at the age of the minor, her capacity to make
decisions, and the protection inherent in having adults represent her.
The court decided that, together, these factors sufficiently protected
171. 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
172. Id. at 9.
173. 389 F. Supp. 947 (D. Colo. 1975).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 957.
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her interests. 176 This case is limited because it does not discuss the
issues of parental notice or consent. Still, Foe is important because the
court draws a bright line at age fourteen, finding that a minor over
age fourteen is mature enough to bring a suit on her own behalf. This
result is consistent with the cases from Michigan and Missouri, al-
lowing minors over age fourteen greater freedom to bring lawsuits.
2. Cases Stating Parents Cannot Waive Their Children's Causes of
Action
Many state courts have determined that parents cannot waive
their children's rights of action. This prohibition is enforced either by
a refusal to find valid pre-injury release forms signed by parents on
behalf of their children, or by a refusal to uphold statutes of limita-
tions that are dependant on parental enforcement. These cases sug-
gest that Danforth's admonition against providing parents with an
absolute veto of their children's rights extends beyond the abortion
context, to situations where a minor has a right of action and needs to
enforce that right in court. Additionally, these cases present a limit to
the presumption that parents act in the best interests of their chil-
dren. Although courts may sometimes honor this presumption, they
have been unwilling to do so when parents attempt to waive their chil-
dren's substantive rights.
Courts in Alaska, Arizona, Maryland, Missouri, New Mexico,
Ohio, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia have refused to enforce statutes
of limitations which depend on a parent bringing suit on behalf of the
minor.177 This suggests that parental authority does not extend to the
decision to extinguish a child's legal claim.
The language of these cases is protective of minors and their legal
rights. For example, the Alaska Supreme Court noted that "the State
cannot lightly close the courthouse doors to minors.' 78 The Missouri
Supreme Court discussed the need to "safeguard the minor's constitu-
tionally guaranteed right of access to the courts," 179 and the Utah Su-
preme Court stated:
176. Id.
177. Sands v. Green, 156 P.3d 1130 (Alaska 2007); Barrio v. San Manuel Div. Hosp. for
Magma Copper Co., 692 P.2d 280 (Ariz. 1984); Piselli v. 75th St. Med., 808 A.2d 508 (Md.
2002); Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1986); Rider v. Albuquerque Pub.
Sch., 923 P.2d 604 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996); Mominee v. Scherbarth, 503 N.E.2d 717 (Ohio
1986); Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1995); Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 590
(Utah 1993); Whitlow v. Bd. of Educ. of Kanawha County, 438 S.E.2d 15 (W.Va. 1993).
178. Sands, 156 P.3d at 1136.
179. Strahler, 706 S.W.2d at 11.
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[t] he law must guard the rights of children, many of whom, unfor-
tunately, live in families where attention to a child's needs may be
wanting . . . . [T]he possibility that a child's rights may be lost
through a parent's or another caregiver's neglect, indifference, or
abandonment is too great for the law to ignore."180
In these examples, courts are not worried about invading the
province of parents who may have decided not to bring suit. Instead,
the court is concerned with protecting the rights of minors who would
otherwise be unable to access courts. This logic also supports remov-
ing obstacles for minors to get to court in other situations where they
will be unable to bring their claims after age eighteen, or where they
will be harmed by waiting until they are age eighteen. This is espe-
cially true in states providing a constitutional right of access to the
courts.
Courts have also directly refused to defer to parents decision-
making about their children when parents have tried to release their
children's legal claims. Courts in Colorado, 18 1 Connecticut, 8 2 Flor-
ida, 18 3 Kansas, 184 Maine, 85 New Jersey, 186 Tennessee, 187 Texas, 188
Utah, ' 89 and Washington' 90 have invalidated parental releases of mi-
nors' legal claims (such as when parents sign injury release forms on
behalf of their children). These courts generally rely on the need to
protect children, suggesting that parental authority must yield if a
question of harm to the child arises. 19 1 Additionally, the Colorado Su-
preme Court discussed how the decision to waive a claim is fundamen-
tally different from those involved in the "care, custody, and control"
of one's children. 19 2 In Cooper v. United States Ski Association, the court
noted that waiver of a child's litigation rights is "not of the same char-
acter and quality as those rights recognized as implicating a parents'
fundamental liberty interest in the 'care, custody, and control' of their
180. Lee, 867 P.2d at 590.
181. Cooper v. Aspen Skiing, Co., 48 P.3d 1229 (Colo. 2002), superseded 1y statute, COLO.
REv. STAT. § 13-22-107 (2005)).
182. Fedor v. Mauwehu Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 143 A.2d 466 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1958).
183. Global Travel Mktg., Inc. v. Shea, 908 So. 2d 392, 397 (Fla. 2005).
184. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Lasca, 99 P. 616 (Kan. 1909).
185. Doyle v. College, 403 A.2d 1206 (Me. 1979).
186. Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 868 A.2d 1087 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
187. Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).
188. Munoz v. IIJaz Inc., 863 S.W.2d 207, 210 (Tex. App. 1993).
189. Hawkins v. Peart, 37 P.3d 1062 (Utah 2001).
190. Scott v. Pac. W. Mt. Resort, 834 P.2d 6 (Wash. 1992).
191. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aspen Skiing, 48 P.3d 1229, 1232 (Colo. 2002); Global Travel
Mktg., Inc. v. Shea, 908 So. 2d 392, 397 (Fla. 2005); Munoz, 863 S.W.2d at 210.
192. Cooper, 48 P.3d at 1232.
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children."1 93 The court also noted that even if the parent's right was
implicated, that right is not absolute and must yield to protect the
child's well-being.194
Although these cases all dealt with tort claims, the principle
enunciated appears applicable in the case of a minor seeking to bring
a lawsuit without parental notice/consent. Just as the decision to re-
lease a child's tort claim is of a different character than the decisions
generally protected by the right to rear children, so too is the decision
to prevent a child from bringing a claim to vindicate her right under a
harassment statute or the Constitution. While a child is not harmed by
a parent's decision to raise the child to follow a certain religion, a
child is harmed when she is prevented from bringing a lawsuit to chal-
lenge a school policy. This harm is comparable to a child whose tort
claim is permanently extinguished by her parent. That a parent has
religious beliefs concerning homosexuality is irrelevant if the child
desires to vindicate a statutory right, just as a parent's religious belief
that obtaining money in a settlement is immoral would not give that
parent the right to waive her minor child's tort claim.
3. Other Cases Supporting the Rights of Minors
In Mendillo v. Board of Education,195 the court endorsed a theory
similar to Janet Dolgin's, 196 that the "decisions of the United States
Supreme Court over the last thirty years reflect a growing awareness
that the legal status of children has changed, like that of women,
'from that of a chattel to that of a person entitled to legal redress for
wrongs done to [the child].' "197
And, in Kirkpatrick v. Eighth Judicial District Court, the Nevada Su-
preme Court used reasoning similar to Hodgson to invalidate a law re-
quiring both parents consent before a minor could marry.1 98 It noted
that while the rights of parents are fundamental, "they are not abso-
lute .... The state also has an interest in the welfare of children and
may limit parental authority.. . . If the state can completely eliminate
all parental rights, it can certainly limit some parental rights when the
193. Id. at 1235 n.ll (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1994)).
194. Id.
195. Mendillo v. Bd. of Educ., 717 A.2d 1177, 1199 (Conn. 1998).
196. SeeJanet Dolgin, The Fate of Childhood: Legal Models of Children and the Parent-Child
Relationship, 61 ALB. L. REv. 345 (1997).
197. Mendillo, A.2d at 1199 (quoting Note, The Child's Right to Sue for Loss of a Parent's
Love, Care and Companionship Caused by Tortious Injury to the Parent, 56 B.U. L. REv. 722, 742
(1976)).
198. Kirkpatrick v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 64 P.3d 1056, 1062-63 (Nev. 2003).
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competing rights of the child are implicated. '" 19 9 The Tennessee
Court of Appeals, meanwhile, stated that minors over age fourteen
have a common law rebuttable presumption of capacity to consent to
medical treatment.200
4. Cases Expanding the Rights of Parents
While many states have found in favor of minors when there is a
clash between minors and parents, others have stated strong presump-
tions in favor of parental rights, going beyond the United States Su-
preme Court. California directly addressed the issue of children
bringing lawsuits when their parents object, and twice stated that par-
ents may control their minor children's lawsuits. In Aronson v. Superior
Court,20 1 the court wrote:
Except in egregious situations calling for interference with legal
custody, the parents, not the courts, make decisions for the minor.
The decision to file a malpractice action is one such decision. No-
where in the statute is there language authorizing special excep-
tions for the minor whose parents simply refuse to sue when,
perhaps, some person would conclude they should .... Nor is a
court in any event well situated tojudge the wisdom of the parental
choice to sue or not to sue. We are not inclined to hold as a matter
of law that a lawsuit is always the best use of family resources and
energy. Nor are we inclined, or authorized, to take over the deci-
sions relative to the care of minors. 20 2
In Williams v. Superior Court,203 the court agreed with Aronson, not-
ing in dicta that "[the] [] ather argues that Aronson recognized that
parents have the right to determine if and when their child should
bring a civil lawsuit. We have no quarrel with this principle. '20 4
However, these cases dealt with very different situations than
those at issue in this Article. In Aronson, the minor was left mentally
impaired at his birth, and unable to select his own guardian. 20 5 The
only relevant question for the court was whether to privilege the par-
ent's decision not to sue over another adult's desire to sue. Thus, Ar-
onson should be understood in context: as a tort case where there was
no evidence of the parent acting contrary to the best wishes of the
minor. Similarly, in Williams, also a tort case, the parent lost his chal-
199. Id. at 1059 (footnotes omitted).
200. Decker v. Carroll Academy, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 336, at *38-39 (Tenn. Ct.
App. May 26, 1999).
201. 236 Cal. Rptr. 347 (Ct. App. 1987).
202. Id. at 351.
203. 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 13 (Ct. App. 2007).
204. Id. at 25.
205. Aronson v. Superior Court, 236 Cal. Rptr. 347, 348 (Ct. App. 1987).
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lenge arguing that he should be appointed guardian ad litem. The
court mentioned briefly in dicta that parents have the right to deter-
mine if and when their children bring a lawsuit. There is no language
to suggest the court considered, let alone ruled on, the situations dis-
cussed in this Article. Thus, not only is California the only state to
explicitly hold that parents control the minor's right to sue, it is un-
clear whether this decision even applies outside of the medical mal-
practice context.
Louisiana, 20 6 Maryland, 20 7 and Virginia 208 have upheld statutes of
limitations preventing minors from bringing lawsuits unless their par-
ents act on their behalf. Courts in Massachusetts 20 9 and Ohio2 10 have
held that pre-injury releases signed by parents are valid. However,
these cases generally do not include in-depth balancing of the rights
of parents and their minor children. To the contrary, the Louisiana,
Maryland, and Virginia cases discuss the legislature's ability to draw
statutes of limitations to limit medical malpractice "crises." In doing
so, these states presume parents will act in the best interests of their
children. For example, the Virginia Supreme Court notes, "The legis-
lature was thus free to presume that some adult responsible for the
minor's welfare, usually a parent, would act diligently and prudently
to protect the minor's interests." 211
Regarding the pre-injury release cases, both appear limited to ac-
tivities in which the minors had no underlying rights to participate.
The Massachusetts case rested on the fact that the minor had no inde-
pendent right to participate in extracurricular athletic activities.
Therefore the parent could release the minor's claim for injury from
participation. 212 The Ohio cases considered recreational activities,
where the children again had no inherent right to participate. This
calculus may change where the parent prevents a child from exercis-
ing a right derived from a constitutionally protected interest.
Courts have considered the conflict between a minor and a par-
ent in other situations. In Newman v. Cole, the court refused to abro-
gate the doctrine of parental tort immunity, and stated: "[P]arental
authority will not be interfered with, except in case of gross miscon-
206. Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So. 2d 305, 314 (La. 1986).
207. Rios v. Montgomery County, 872 A.2d 1, 20 (Md. 2005).
208. Willis v. Mullett, 561 S.E.2d 705 (Va. 2002).
209. Sharon v. City of Newton, 769 N.E.2d 738, 741-42 (Mass. 2002).
210. Mohney v. USA Hockey, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 859, 872-73 (D. Ohio 1999) (citing
Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 696 N.E.2d 201, 207 (Ohio 1998)).
211. Willis, 561 S.E. 2d at 708.
212. Sharon, 769 N.E.2d at 745.
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duct or where, from some other cause, the parent wants either the
capacity or the means for the proper nurture and training of the
child."213 In State v. Iban C, the Connecticut Supreme Court found a
"strong but rebuttable presumption exists that the responsibility for
making decisions and speaking for minor children vests in the par-
ents" and that this presumption can only be overcome in "exceptional
cases." 214 The Florida Court of Appeals, meanwhile, found Florida's
right to privacy grants parents the right to make decisions concerning
their children's welfare without third-party interference.2 1 5
5. Conclusions
The state cases reflect the idea that the parental right to rear chil-
dren is designed to protect the best interests of the minor and to cre-
ate conditions in which minors can make "good" decisions. Nine state
courts ruled that statutes of limitations must be extended to allow mi-
nors to bring claims, and ten stated that parents cannot release their
children's tort claims. However, only three have found that statutes of
limitations may restrict minors' rights of access to courts, and only two
have found that parents may release their children's tort claims (and
only in certain contexts). States that value greater parental authority
have consistently defended their positions on the grounds that more
parental authority will not harm minors. Overwhelmingly, then, the
focus is on the best interests of the minor.
E. State Rights of Access to Courts
Thirty-three states provide a constitutional right of access to
courts.21 6 In addition to these thirty-three states, five have a judicially
recognized right.2 17 Thus, thirty-eight states consider access to courts
a fundamental state-law right. Of these thirty-eight states, five have ex-
plicitly extended this right to minors. 218 The cases extending the right
to minors show a familiar concern for the child's well-being. For ex-
213. Newman v. Cole, 872 So. 2d 138, 144 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Ex parle Sullivan, 407
So. 2d 559, 563 (Ala. 1981)).
214. State v. Iban C., 881 A.2d 1005, 1032 (Conn. 2005) (citing Bowen v. Am. Hosp.
Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 627 (1986)).
215. Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Petersen, 920 So. 2d 75, 80 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2006).
216. See infra app. tbl.1 col. 5 (Right of Access to Court).
217. See infra app. tbl.1 col. 5 (Right of Access to Court).
218. See In reJ.J., 566 N.E. 2d 1345, 1349-50 (Ill. 1991); Cundiff by Cundiff v. Daviess
County Hosp., 656 N.E.2d 298, 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Piselli v. 75th St. Med., 808 A.2d
508, 525 (Md. 2002); Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7, 11 (Mo. 1986); Weiner v.
Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316, 318 (Tex. 1995).
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ample, in Strahler the Missouri Supreme Court noted that "the general
tolling provisions of section 516.170 preserve the cause of action for a
minor and safeguard the minor's constitutionally guaranteed right of
access to the courts-even if parents, guardians or others having cus-
tody of a child fail to protect the child's legal rights." 219 In these states,
minors should be able to argue that parental notice/consent statutes
unfairly burden their fundamental right of access to courts. Like a
minor whose tort claim would otherwise be extinguished, minors in
these situations may never be able to exercise their rights, unless they
are allowed to do so without parental notice/consent.
F. State Abortion Statutes
Although thirty-seven states have abortion statutes requiring pa-
rental notice/consent, thirteen do not.220 In these thirteen states, mi-
nors have the right to receive abortions without parental notice/
consent.221 Some of these states lack statutory law about this issue,
while others have modified the Bellotti II requirements. Connecticut
law requires physician counseling about the possibility of involving the
minor's parents, and Maryland law substitutes the physician's judg-
ment for the judicial bypass. 222 This provides another example of leg-
islatures more concerned with ensuring that minors make informed
decisions than with protecting parental authority.
Three states with abortion statutes have cases that have arguably
invalidated the statues. California,223 Florida, 224 and New Jersey225
courts have all interpreted state constitutions as providing minors with
greater abortion rights. In American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren,
the California Supreme Court stated that there exists a state constitu-
tional interest in personal autonomy. This interest extends to minors
and can only be infringed by a compelling state interest.2 26 Thus, the
court found unconstitutional a statute requiring a minor obtain either
parental consent or judicial authorization before an abortion.
219. Strahler, 706 S.W.2d at 11.
220. See infra app. tbl.1 col. 6 (Judicial Bypass Statute).
221. See infra app. tbll.
222. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-601 (2007); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-103(C)
(LexisNexis 2004).
223. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 800 (Cal. 1997).
224. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612, 616 (Fla.
2003).
225. Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620, 622 (N.J. 2000).
226. Lungren, 940 P.2d at 811.
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Florida similarly invalidated a statute requiring parental notice or
judicial authorization, finding it infringed on minors' rights to pri-
vacy.227 And in Farmer, the New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated a
statute that conditioned a minor's abortion on parental notification
or judicial bypass. 228 Relying on state privacy provisions, the New
Jersey Supreme Court favored the rights of minors over parents. The
court noted that the maturity of minors is respected in other areas,
such as consenting to caesarian sections, 229 and that minors choosing
abortions do not "suffer greater psychological problems." 230 Addition-
ally, the court noted that many minors come from abusive families
and are justified in not wanting to notify their parents. 231 In these
three decisions, the courts found that (1) minors have rights, (2) mi-
nors are capable of exercising those rights in a mature fashion; and
(3) a minor attempting to exercise her rights may be burdened by
parental notice/consent. 232
G. Conclusions
Taken together, these statutes, rules, and case law suggest that
states generally impose a screening process on minors' cases not im-
posed on adults. This screening requires minors go to court through a
guardian ad litem to protect the minor's best interests. Courts pre-
sume that parents are usually the best people to represent the best
interests of the minor, and thus parents make ideal sponsors for mi-
nors' lawsuits. However, if the parent is not acting in the best interest
of the minor, then courts will appoint a responsible adult to represent
the minor. On the whole, both state statutes and case law support the
proposition that when parents' and minors' rights conflict, legisla-
tures and courts should look to the minor's best interest. In making
this assessment, the court should take the course of action that best
enhances the minor's decision-making capability, without harming
the minor.
227. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., 866 So. 2d at 622.
228. Farmer, 762 A.2d at 638-39.
229. Id. at 636.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 634 (citing H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 438-39 (1981)).
232. See Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 811 (Cal. 1997) (holding
that minors have rights and may exercise those rights); N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling
Servs., 866 So. 2d at 622 (acknowledging that requiring parental notification makes exercis-
ing rights difficult); Farmer, 762 A.2d at 638.
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IV. Expanding the Mature Minors Doctrine
A. The Legal Construction of Adolescence
Adolescents occupy a unique place in society: they are not yet
adults, but are also no longer children. The legal status of adolescents
is equally mixed. Adolescents cannot receive the death penalty, vote,
drink, or sign binding contracts. They cannot marry, join the military,
or have surgery without parental consent. Yet the law allows them to
consent to certain types of healthcare, 233 they may be sexually ac-
tive, 23 4 may purchase contraceptives,23 5 and may drive. And, the jus-
tice system frequently treats them as adults. Many adolescent cases are
transferred to adult court, and the age of eligibility for transfer to
adult court has been lowered in recent years. 236 Recent bills have also
tried to lower the age at which adolescents can be treated as adults for
federal prosecutions. 237 Thus, adolescents occupy an in-between posi-
tion in the eyes of the law.
Some argue that the legal construction of adolescence is the re-
sult of changes in the nature of the family.238 Adolescence was not
described and identified until the early twentieth century, 239 and
some believe it has recently been re-defined. 240 Thus, it is not surpris-
ing that most laws codifying the special status of adolescence have
been passed in the last fifty years. The newness of these doctrines
should not be overstated. Although they were recently codified, there
233. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 73 (1976); Farmer,
762 A.2d at 638.
234. See OFFICE OF PUB. HEALTH & SCI., STATE LAWS ON AGE REQUIREMENTS AND SEX
(2008), http://www.4parents.gov/sexrisky/teen-sex/statelawschart/statelaws_chart.html.
Many state rape statutes set the age of consent at age 16, allowing minors over this age to
consent to sexual activity. Even for states that set the age at 18, most draw an exception for
younger minors having sex with a partner their age. Id.
235. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 692-94 (1977).
236. See Dolgin, supra note 196, at 426-29.
237. Id. at 426.
238. Id. at 349-50. Dolgin argues there have been wide-ranging changes in the nature
and meaning of the family, from a site of industrial production to a place of individual,
autonomous, non-market fulfillment. Id. at 351-52. The shift to viewing children as auton-
omous individuals has thus blurred the boundary between childhood and adulthood. As
the ones closest to adulthood, adolescents occupy this blurred zone. It is thus no surprise
that the law is conflicted, viewing them sometimes as children and sometimes as adults. Id.
at 352.
239. Elizabeth Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. Rav. 547, 597
(2000).
240. Paul Arshagouni, "But I'm an Adult Now... Sort of": Adolescent Consent in Health Care
Decision Making and the Adolescent Brain, 9J. HEALTH CARE L. & PoL'Y 315, 317-23 (2007).
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is ample precedent in older cases recognizing the increased capacity
of mature minors. 241
B. The Mature Minor Doctrine
With the formalization of adolescence and the development of
adolescent medicine came the legal recognition of the mature minor
doctrine: that minors over a certain age are presumed mature and can
consent to certain procedures. This doctrine fits with the idea that
parent-child cases are about protecting minors' decision-making abili-
ties. In certain situations, legislatures have concluded that minors are
capable of making competent decisions. Assured that minors have
achieved sufficient maturity, neither legislatures nor courts concern
themselves with abridging parental rights.
Almost every state has legislation allowing mature minors to con-
sent to treatment of sexually transmitted diseases ("STDs").242 These
states vary in the age at which they allow minors to consent.243 They
also vary in the level of protection given minors, with some always al-
lowing minors to consent and others only allowing minors to consent
if their parents are unwilling or unable. 244 Some states allow minors to
consent, but give the treating physician authority to override the mi-
nor's wishes and notify a parent if the physician believes it in the mi-
nor's best interest.
241. There is the common law rule of sevens, for example. This rule was first described
in an 1845 English case, The Queen v. Smith Cox C.C. 260 (Crim.) (1845). Arshagouni,
supra note 240, at 332. Arshagouni describes the case as creating the proposition that:
[M]inors under seven years of age carry an irrebutable presumption of no capac-
ity (incapable of harmful intent). Minors between the ages of seven and fourteen
have a rebuttable presumption of no capacity. Minors from the ages of fourteen
to twenty-one have a rebuttable presumption of capacity. Those over twenty-one
are presumed to have full capacity.
Id. This rule was cited in a 1996 Tennessee case, Roddy v. Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc., 926
S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn.
1987)).
242. See Rhonda Gay Hartman, Coming of Age: Devising Legislation for Adolescent Medical
Decision-Making, 28 AM. J. L. & MED. 409, 416 n.38 (2002) (collecting relevant statutes).
243. California, Delaware, Illinois, and Vermont set the age at twelve. See CAL. FAM.
CODE § 6926 (West 2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 710 (1999); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 210/4
(1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4226 (1982). Idaho sets it at age fourteen. IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 39-3801 (2008). The rest of the statutes do not state an age requirement.
244. Alaska, for example, allows minors who still live with their parents or legal guard-
ian to consent, but only if the minor's parent is unwilling to consent. ALAsKA STAT.
§ 25.20.025 (2008).
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In addition to the STD-treatment statutes, twelve states have HIV-
testing statutes that mention minors. 245 Like the STD-treatment stat-
utes, their age requirements vary, with some allowing all minors to
consent, and others limiting the right to minors above a certain
age. 2 4 6 The state HIV-testing statutes also vary in levels of confidential-
ity and degree of parental involvement required.2 47
Many of these statutes allow physicians to override the minor's
decision and notify the minor's parents, or provide for physician
counseling about the benefits of parental notification.248 States also
provide statutory protection for minors seeking to undergo substance
abuse treatment.2 49 Many of these provisions do not explicitly provide
245. Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Michigan provide that
while minors may consent to testing and treatment, physicians may choose to notify the
minor's parent, if the physician thinks doing so is in the minor's best interest. See ARK.
CODE ANN. § 20-16-508(b) (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 710(c); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-17-
7(b) (2006); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 214.185(6) (LexisNexis 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1065.1(C) (2008); MICH. COMp. LAws § 333.5127(2) (2005). Illinois encourages in-
volving the minor's parents, but only allows the physician to involve them if the minor
consents. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 210/4.
246. Montana, New Mexico, and Ohio allow all minors to consent to HIV testing. See
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-1007(8) (2008); N.M. STAT. § 24-2B-3 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3701.242(B) (2005). California and Delaware allow minors over age twelve to con-
sent to testing. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 121020(a)(1) (West 2008); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 16, § 1202(0. Wisconsin allows minors over age fourteen to consent to testing.
WIs. STAT. § 252.15(2)4 (2007).
247. North Carolina, for example, allows minors to consent to HIV testing, but only in
situations in which "the parent or guardian has refused to consent to such testing and
there is reasonable suspicion that the minor has AIDS virus or HIV infection or that the
child has been sexually abused." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(h) (2007). Iowa, meanwhile,
allows minors to consent to HIV testing, but mandates parental notification if the test re-
sult is positive. IOWA CODE § 141A.7(3) (2008).
248. Colorado allows all minors to receive confidential treatment, but also provides
that for a minor under age sixteen, the physician "may" notify the minors' parents. COLO.
REV. STAT. § 25-4-1405(6) (2007). The statute also requires physician counseling about the
benefits of notifying one's parent. Id. Michigan allows minors to consent to HIV testing
and treatment, but also provides that a physician may override the minor's decision and
inform his parents. MICH. COMP. LAws § 333.5127(1)-(2) (West 2008). Connecticut law
provides for parental consent, but allows the physician to waive this consent. CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 19a-592(a) (2007). While more restrictive than other state statutes, the Connecticut
statute implicitly recognizes that some minors will not seek treatment unless they can re-
ceive it confidentially, and appears to determine that the harm to untreated minors is
greater than any benefit from forcing minors to obtain parental consent.
249. See Hartman, supra note 242, at 417, n.42 (citing ALA. CODE § 22-8-6 (1997)); ARiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-133.01 (1994); CAL. FAm. CODE § 6929(b) (West 1994); COLO. REv.
STAT. § 13-22-102 (2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17A-688 (West 1998 & Supp. 2002);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 397.601(4)(a) (West 2002); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 210/4 (1997); IND.
CODE ANN. § 12-23-12-1 (West 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2892a (1992); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 222.441 (West 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1096A (West 2000); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 1502 (West 1992 & Supp. 2001); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-
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age limits, though a few provisions limit the testing right to older mi-
nors.250 Like HIV-testing statutes and substance abuse treatment stat-
utes, the states vary in levels of protection granted to minors. 251 Many
states vest the physician (or substance abuse counselor) with discre-
tion concerning whether to notify the minor's parents.252
Additionally, some states provide that adolescents may obtain ac-
cess to family planning services without parental notice/consent, and
that minors may consent to pregnancy-related services. 253 These stat-
utes commonly allow physicians to notify parents if they believe notifi-
cation is in the minor's interests.254 Together, these statutes reflect
102(C)(1)-(2) (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 112, § 12E (2000); MICH. COMP. LAws
ANN. § 333.6121(1) (West 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(1) (West 1998); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 41-41-14 (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. § 129.050 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17A4 (West
1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3719.012 (West 2002); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1690.112
(West 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4226 (1982); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2969(E) (3)
(2002); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 60A-5-504 (e) (LexisNexis 2001); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.47
(West 1997)).
250. Arizona, California, Illinois, and Wisconsin set the line at age twelve. See ARiz. REV.
STAT. § 44-133.01 (2007); CAL FAM. CODE § 6929 (West 2007); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 210/4
(2008); Wis. STAT. § 51.47 (2007). Mississippi draws the line at age fifteen. Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 41-41-14 (2008).
251. Connecticut provides that parents may only be notified if the minor consents to
parental notification. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-688(d) (2007). New Jersey only mentions
parental notification in cases of sexual assault and states that except where required by law,
information between the patient and physician is to be considered confidential. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 9:17A-4 (West 2007). Illinois, meanwhile, provides for making reasonable efforts to
involve the family in the minor's treatment. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 210/4 (2008). Nevada
allows physicians to treat patients without parental consent, but then provides that "any
physician who treats a minor pursuant to this section shall make every reasonable effort to
report the fact of treatment to the parent, parents or legal guardian within a reasonable
time after treatment." NEV. REv. STAT. § 129.050(3) (2007).
252. Hawaii provides that "the counselor shall seek to open the lines of communica-
tion between the minor and the spouse, parent, custodian, or guardian; provided such
action is deemed beneficial in achieving the desired counseling objectives." HAw. REV.
STAT. § 577-26(0 (2007). Michigan allows parents to be notified without the minor's con-
sent "for medical reasons." MICH. CoMP. LAws § 333.6121(2) (2008). Mississippi and Penn-
sylvania also allow physicians discretion to notify parents absent the minor's consent. Miss.
CODE ANN. § 41-41-14(2) (2008); 71 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1690.112 (West 2007).
253. See Hartman, supra note 242, at 418 n.56 (citing ALA. CODE § 22-8-6 (1997);
ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.025(a) (4) (2001); CAL. FAm. CODE § 6925(a) (West 1994); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit 13, § 710 (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 743.065(1) (West 2002); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 577A-4 (LexisNexis 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-123 (1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 214.185 (West 1998); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-102(c)(4) (2000); MASS. GEN.
LAws ch. 112, § 12F (2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343 (West 1998); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 431.061(4)(a) (West 2002); MONT-. CODE ANN. § 41-1-402(2)(c) (2001); OKLA. STAT. tit.
63, § 2602(A)(3) (West 1997); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 10103 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-
2969(E) (2) (2002)).
254. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 710(c) (2008); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 214.185(6) (West
2008); MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. § 20-102(f) (West 2008).
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the objectives of the state procedural rules discussed earlier in section
111.255 The statutes protect minors when their parents are not acting in
their best interests, and commonly require another responsible adult
(usually the treating physician) to verify that any action taken is in-
deed in the minor's best interest.
Recently, states have begun passing mental health statutes that
protect the confidentiality of minors. At least fourteen states and the
District of Columbia allow minors to consent to mental health ser-
vices. The majority of these states set a minimum age for consent to
these services. 256 Some of these states also give clinicians the right to
decide whether parents should be notified. 257 Interestingly, some of
these statutes provide for judicial bypasses similar to those present in
abortion statutes. For instance, Wisconsin allows minors over age four-
teen to consent, though they must first petition a county officer for
the right to do so.25 8 Meanwhile, the District of Columbia and New
255. For more commentary on these statutes, see Abigail English & Madlyn Morreale,
Children's Health Symposium: A Legal and Policy Framework for Adolescent Health Care: Past, Pre-
sent, and Future, 1 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 63 (2001); Hartman, supra note 242;
Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Whose Body Is It Anyway? An Updated Model of Healthcare Decision-
Making Rights for Adolescents, 14 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'x 251 (2005); Cara D. Watts, Ask-
ing Adolescents: Does a Mature Minor Have a Right to Participate in Health Care Decisions?, 16
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LJ. 221 (2005).
256. Montana allows minors over age 16 to consent to receive mental health services.
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-112(2) (2007). New York, Maryland, Texas, and Oklahoma
also draw lines at age sixteen. See N.Y. MENTAL Hvc. LAW § 33.21 (e) (2) (Consol. 2008); MD.
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-104(a)(1) (2008); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 572.001 (Vernon 2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 5-503 (2007). California allows minors
over age twelve to receive treatment. See CAL FAM. CODE § 6924(b) (West 2007). Penn-
sylvania, Michigan, and Ohio allow minors over age fourteen to consent to non-psycho-
tropic drug treatment, though Michigan and Ohio limit the number of sessions a minor
may receive before the parents must be notified. See 50 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7201 (West 2007);
MICH. COMP. LAws § 330.1707 (1) (2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.04(A) (West
2008). Washington allows all minors over age thirteen to consent to mental health care.
WASH. REv. CODE § 71.34.500(1) (2008). Florida allows minors over thirteen to consent to
treatment but limits the number of sessions a minor may attend before parents are notified
and does not allow minors to receive medication without parental notification. FLA. STAT.
§ 394.4784(1) (2007).
257. California, for example, allows the clinician to determine whether parental in-
volvement would be detrimental to the minor. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6924(d) (West 2007).
Similarly, in Maryland, clinicians are allowed to determine that parental notification is in
the minor's best interest. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-104 (b) (1) (West 2008). Con-
necticut, meanwhile, allows minors to consent to receive mental health services (excluding
psychotropic drugs), provided the clinician believes they are mature enough to receive
them and has reason to believe parental notification is not in the child's best interest,
though the law leaves it to the doctor's discretion the number of sessions a minor may
receive without parental consent. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-14c (2007).
258. Wis. STAT. § 51.14 (2007).
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York allow minors under age sixteen to seek judicial authorization to
receive psychotropic medications. 259
Thematically, the STD-treatment statutes, pregnancy care stat-
utes, substance abuse treatment statutes, and mental health care stat-
utes are similar. They all privilege the needs of the minor over the
parents and facilitate the minor's decision-making process. Minors
may consent, and where the physician thinks this consent is in the
minor's best interest, the minor's judgment is usually respected. How-
ever, where the physician believes otherwise, then the physician may
notify a parent, presumably based on the premise that not doing so
will harm the minor. Notification is more likely required in dangerous
situations, such as when a minor is admitted to a hospital. It is less
likely in lower stakes situations, such as when a minor seeks mental
health counseling. This is probably because legislatures believe mi-
nors better able to make less dangerous decisions on their own.
Also interesting are the age ranges in the statutes. Although many
of the treatment and testing statutes do not set minimum ages for
consent, almost all of the mental healthcare statutes set such a mini-
mum. This may be due to the nature of the activities being treated, as
lawmakers may have assumed mature minors are more likely to en-
gage in sexual activity and substance abuse, and thus found age limits
unnecessary in these statutes. In contrast, there is nothing unique to
older minors seeking mental health treatment. Here, lawmakers may
have found it more important to draw lines reflecting differential abil-
ities to consent.
Despite their prevalence, mature minor statutes are a relatively
recent legal development. One of the first was a California statute en-
acted in 1953; most of the others were passed between the late 1960s
and the late 1980s. 260 The mental health decision-making statutes are
even more recent, with the majority of them enacted in the past
twenty years. The fact that so many of these statutes have been passed
in the last sixty years suggests that legislatures have become more re-
ceptive to the idea that adolescents can make some decisions without
parental input. All of these statutes have converged on the idea that
there are certain areas where minors need protection from harm. In
these areas, minors are granted the rights to make important deci-
sions without notifying their parents. In some states, other adults, such
as physicians, become the responsible adult "screen" of the minor's
259. See D.C. CODE § 7-1231.14(c)(1) (2008); N.Y. MENTAL Hyc. LAw § 33.21(e) (2)
(Consol. 2008).
260. Abigail English & Madlyn Morreale, supra note 255, at 71, 75.
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decision, a safety net designed to ensure that the minor not make a
decision contrary to her long-term best interests. In other states, legis-
latures have determined minors are capable of making decisions on
their own and can consider their best interests, absent adult oversight.
The mature minor doctrine is not perfect. Indeed, some scholars
have argued for its expansion within the medical context.2 61 Still, ma-
ture minor statutes provide an example of what could be done in the
context of a minor seeking access to court. State legislatures could
similarly draw the line at a certain age, and allow minors above that
age to petition for the appointment of guardians ad litem without pa-
rental notice/consent, provided the judge agrees such petition is in
the minor's best interest. If a guardian ad litem is appointed, then
states can either allow the minor to proceed with the case without
parental notice/consent, or give this decision to the guardian, who
would only notify the minor's parent of the lawsuit if the guardian
found notification to be in the minor's best interest.
V. Theories of Adolescent Decision-Making
Adolescence is the time when minors are faced with the task of
"grow[ing] into free and independent well-developed men and citi-
zens."262 Minors need space in adolescence to develop their identities,
and the law should protect this space so that minors may explore and
develop into mature, emotionally healthy adults. When the minor
makes certain decisions on her own, this development process is fur-
thered. This Part explores research on adolescent decision-making
and concludes adolescents are capable of making the decision to seek
the appointment of a guardian ad litem.
A. Minors and Decision-Making
At issue in this Article is a minor's ability to make informed deci-
sions without the assistance of her parents. Studies show that while
there are some areas where adolescents exercise impaired judgment
relative to adults, there are also areas where adolescents are capable of
making informed decisions.
261. See, e.g., William Adams, "But Do You Have to Tell My Parents?": The Dilemma for
Minors Seeking HIV-Testing and Treatment, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 493 (1994); Christopher
Garfield, Enabling Responsibility: Adolescent Autonomy and the Teen HIV Crisis in the United
States, 8J. MED. & L. 87 (2004); Hartman, supra note 242; Mutcherson, supra note 255; Cara
D. Watts, supra note 255.
262. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
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Piagetian developmental theory suggests cognitive development
occurs in predictable stages, with the highest stage reached between
ages eleven and fourteen, when adolescents become capable of rea-
soning abstractly and deductively. 263 As Elizabeth Cauffman and Lau-
rence Steinberg noted, Piaget's theory suggests that "adolescents who
have reached the formal operational stage have cognitive abilities
equivalent to those of adults."264
Many recent studies found little to no difference between an ado-
lescent's and an adult's ability to make decisions. Adolescents perceive
relative risks (i.e., risks to themselves as opposed to others) as accu-
rately as adults do. 265 Perhaps because of the issues visibility, many of
these studies have focused on abortion, concluding that adolescents
are equally competent at making this sensitive decision. 266 Addition-
ally, studies show that adolescents have similar competence to adults
in making other health-care decisions.2 67
In 2003, J. Shoshanna Ehrlich published a study analyzing 490
interviews and referrals conducted by the Planned Parenthood
League of Massachusetts, and interviews with twenty-six minors who
received judicial authorization for abortions.268 Ehrlich's results con-
firm those of earlier studies suggesting adolescent capacity to make
the abortion decision. Notably, she found that: "they all had clearly-
articulated reasons for why having a child was not a present option for
them, reflecting both an understanding of their present circum-
stances and a dynamic grasp of future possibilities. '" 269 These minors
were able to weigh the present and the future, and to distinguish be-
tween their present selves and their future selves, predicting a time
when they would like to bring children into the world.270
263. Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, The Cognitive and Affective Influences on
Adolescent Decision-Making, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1763, 1768 (1995).
264. Id.
265. MarilynJacobs Quadrel et al., Adolescent (In)vulnerability, 48 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 102,
111-13 (1993).
266. Catherine C. Lewis, A Comparison of Minor's and Adult's Pregnancy Decisions. 50 AM.
J. ORTHOPSYCHiATRY 446, 446-47 (1980).
267. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, ADOLESCENT HEALTH: BACK-
GROUND AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SELECTED PREVENTION AND TREATMENT SERVICES, at 11-22
(1991).
268. J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Grounded in the Reality of Their Lives: Listening to Teens Who
Make the Abortion Decision Without Involving Their Parents, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 61, 89
(2003).
269. Id. at 107.
270. Id. at 110.
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Although they did not consult their parents, every minor inter-
viewed for the Ehrlich study consulted at least one adult prior to mak-
ing the abortion decision. 271 Ehrlich also found the minors took the
decision not to tell their parents "very seriously," and that "they had
multiple reasons that were well-grounded in the realities of their
lives." 272 These reasons included fear of severe adverse parental reac-
tion/parental anger, concern for the minor's relationship with the
parent, concern for the parent, lack of relationship with the parent,
and parental pressure/ideology. 273 All of these concerns are likely fac-
tors in the situation of a minor who wishes to hide her sexuality from
her parent. Since as many as 99.6% of judicial bypass provisions are
granted, 274 there is no reason why Ehrlich's results should not be gen-
eralized to the majority of minors. The results suggest minors are ca-
pable of making the decision to go to court without parental notice/
consent.
Still, some recent scientific studies found differences in adoles-
cent brains, suggesting that adolescents and adults make some deci-
sions differently. For example, newer studies suggest the brain
continues to undergo important developmental processes until the
early twenties.2 75 In particular, researchers had long believed the
brain undergoes a process of overproduction, pruning, and culling
brain cells in the first few years of life. However, some neuroscientists
now believe the brain undergoes a second wave of overproduction,
and then culls these cells into the early twenties. 276 During adoles-
cence the brain increases myelation of dendritic connections, "im-
prov[ing] the speed and efficiency of electro-chemical
transmission. '277 The cerebellum, a part of the brain important to
higher-order thinking and complex problem-solving, 278 does not ma-
ture until the early twenties.2 79 The prefrontal cortex within the fron-
tal lobe, meanwhile, is important to "decision-making, risk assessment,
271. Id. at 108.
272. Id. at 122.
273. Id. at 131-39.
274. See Shield, supra note 40, at 410 (explaining that the "trial court in Hodgson found
that 3558 of 3573 bypass petitions were granted").
275. Arshagouni, supra note 240, at 330 n.94.
276. Id. at 347-48.
277. Id. at 348.
278. See Arshagouni, supra note 240, at 349 n.203 (citing Interview with Jay Giedd, PBS
FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/teenbrain/interviews/
giedd.html (last visited May 1, 2009).
279. Id.
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and the ability to judge future consequences," and appears underde-
veloped in adolescents. 280
Thus, adolescents may make some decisions differently than
adults. For example, the frontal lobe moderates signals from the
amygdala, a part of the brain which plays an important role in emo-
tional processing.281 A minor with an underdeveloped frontal lobe
may have less control over the amygdala, causing the teen to be less
able to control her emotions and more prone to impulsive, risk-taking
behavior.282 Additionally, these cognitive differences may cause ado-
lescents to weigh priorities differently, perhaps privileging the short-
term over the long-term. 283 They are also more likely to engage in
sensation-seeking behavior, preferring activities with high degrees of
novelty and intensity. 284 Adolescents may also be more susceptible to
peer influence, though this peaks at early adolescence. 285
In writing about these cognitive differences, Paul Arshagouni em-
phasizes that cerebellum development "is more influenced by envi-
ronmental factors than genetic ones. ' 286 The very act of making an
important decision involving a minor's critical reasoning skills can as-
sist the minor's development, assuring the minor has the skills she
needs when she reaches adulthood.287 Because of this interaction be-
tween environment and development, Arshagouni believes the way to
support teenage development is not to prevent adolescents from mak-
ing any decisions, but "that the law ought to foster a system that en-
courages adolescents to develop their own critical reasoning and risk
assessment skills during this critical phase of brain development."288
Thus, he believes the law should respect minors' decisions in areas
where they are not "immature, or inexperienced, or lacking in judg-
ment," and believes this includes "a great many health care
decisions." 289
Arshagouni argues for a presumption of capacity to consent for
"all routine, low-risk health care procedures that do not involve poten-
tial adverse long-term consequences," while simultaneously suggesting
280. Id. at 350.
281. Id. at 350-51.
282. Id.
283. See Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 240, at 1772-73.
284. See id. at 1773.
285. See id.
286. Arshagouni, supra note 263, at 349.
287. Id. at 349-50.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 343.
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a rebuttable presumption of no capacity for "high-risk medical proce-
dures, or procedures with potentially adverse long-term
consequences. '" 29 0
B. Conclusions
Minors are capable of making the decision to go to court and
seek the appointment of guardians ad litem. The decision to file a
case is not usually done out of emotion, impulse, or teenage risk-tak-
ing. Thus, it seems to fall on the part of the decision-making spectrum
in which adolescents are most capable of making informed decisions.
Furthermore, the judge, attorney, and adult guardian's presence in
the suit will serve as checks against any irrationality in the minor's
decision. For example, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct re-
quire that the attorney representing the minor protect the minor's
interests. 291
VI. Applying the Mature Minor Doctrine to the Right of
Access to Courts
A. Designing a Right of Access to Courts for Minors
There are a few ways legislatures can design statutory rights of
access to courts. One possibility allows minors to bring causes of ac-
tion in their own names, as the Colorado court did in Straher. A
bright-line rule allowing minors over a certain age, perhaps fourteen,
to go to court without parental notification/consent would solve many
of the problems listed in this Article. Yet, this approach has its limita-
tions. First, although research suggests that many minors are able to
make the decision to bring a lawsuit and gauge whether doing so is in
their best interests, not all are able to do so. As Part V discusses, there
are differences between the adolescent brain and the adult brain.
Many of the statutes recognizing the mature minor doctrine do so in
situations where a mature adult supervises the minor's decision. Thus,
it may be more desirable to have a judge and guardian ad litem verify
that the minor is acting in her long-term best interests.
Also, an approach allowing all minors over age fourteen to bring
their own lawsuits would be hard to reconcile with the Court's parent-
child jurisprudence. The Court has emphasized the role of the parent
in assisting the minor in decision-making, and many parents truly do
act in the best interests of their minor children. Thus, a rule allowing
290. Id. at 359.
291. See MODEL R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.14.
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all minors to bring lawsuits without parental notice/consent, without
a showing that notice/consent would harm the minor, is likely to be
seen as unwanted judicial encroachment on the parental right to rear
children.
Allowing minors to bring their own lawsuits would also possibly
be problematic for other doctrines that protect minors in situations
where their decisional capacity is at its weakest. For example, a rule
allowing all minors to bring lawsuits may imply minors are mature
enough to receive the death penalty. Or, it might threaten the rule
that minors can void contracts. Additionally, since such a broad rule is
substantially different from those already in existence and threatens
parent's rights, it would likely not be politically feasible.
A better solution is to incorporate judicial-bypass provisions to
state procedural statutes concerning appointment of guardians ad li-
tem. These could be straightforward and modeled after state abortion
and mental health care statutes. This solution is a modest extension of
existing law. States already allowing minors above age fourteen could
add provisions clarifying that parental notice/consent is not required
for the minor to petition for the appointment of a guardian. Even in
states that do not expressly allow minors above age fourteen to peti-
tion for a guardian, allowing minors to do so would not be an extreme
departure from existing law. Most of those states have statutes grant-
ing minors access to courts and procedures allowing minors to ap-
point a guardian ad litem. Thus, any change would be relatively small.
Support for this change could be found in the statutes of states that
have already drawn this distinction.
Accordingly, states that do not draw the line at fourteen should
consider modeling their statutes after the states that do, such as Michi-
gan and Missouri. States should also consider adding provisions stat-
ing that a minor aged fourteen (or fifteen or sixteen) is allowed to
petition for a person of her choice to serve as her guardian ad litem.
In addition to other states' laws, such a change is amply supported by
the statutes codifying the mature minor doctrine, which allows minors
over a certain age to consent to certain types of health care. This sim-
ple statutory change will clarify minors' legal rights in these states.
This change would be less far-reaching than allowing minors to
bring their own causes of action. It would rationally advance state pol-
icy goals of protecting minors' best interests, without upsetting ex-
isting legal doctrines. States have an interest in protecting minors, and
should protect minors' procedural right of access to courts. The deci-
sion to seek judicial vindication can be important to the minor's iden-
Spring 2009]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
tity development and general cognitive development. Providing the
safeguards of judicial petition and the presence of a guardian assure
the minor is able to make the decision to go to court when it is in her
best interest.
Practical considerations ensure this modest extension of existing
law would not prove detrimental to the parent-child relationship.
While some minors may be able to obtain funding for such a suit from
outside sources, the costs of the lawsuit will likely induce many minors
to notify their parents. Lawsuits are fairly public, time-consuming
events. Thus, most minors will probably find it far easier to notify their
parents than to try bringing lawsuits in secret. In fact, the only minors
likely not to notify their parents are minors whose parents are already
distant and uninvolved in their decision-making process. These mi-
nors will benefit most from provisions allowing them to seek appoint-
ment of a guardian ad litem without parental notice/consent, since it
will allow them to get more adult input about whether bringing a law-
suit is in their best interests.
B. Effects of Judicial Bypass Provisions
While helpful, provisions allowing minors to get to court without
parental notice/consent will not solve all of the problems listed in
Part I. First, it is likely that only a small subset of minors will be able to
use them, as most minors lack the resources to support a lawsuit. Sec-
ond, a judicial bypass provision will be of little help for minors afraid
to go to court.29 2 Thus, in addition to better rights of access to courts,
continued advocacy for direct rights is important.
Still, the rights advocated in this Article are an important first
step. First, in situations where statutory rights already exist (such as
with an anti-harassment statute), ajudicial bypass would allow a minor
to vindicate her statutory rights despite an unwilling parent. Other-
wise, the courts are closed to that minor. Second, in a situation where
a minor wishes to challenge the constitutionality of a statute, ajudicial
bypass would be a necessary beginning. Even though not all will be
able to use such a bypass, those who do bring cases will affect the
rights of the other minors who cannot, as is the nature of impact liti-
gation. Finally, the existence of a right of access to courts may make it
easier to advocate for legislative change in other areas. If this right
292. See, e.g., M.C. Crosby & A. English, Mandatory Parental Involvement/Judicial Bypass
Laws: Do they Promote Adolesents' Health?, 12 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 143 (1991); Gary B.
Melton, Legal Regulation of Adolescent Abortion: Unintended Effects, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 79,
81-82 (1987).
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exists for a few years and legislators see adolescents are capable of
using it in a mature manner, without disrupting familial harmony,
then state legislators may be more willing to extend similar rights to
adolescents in other areas.
VII. Conclusion
The legal status of LGBT minors is unique. They are granted stat-
utory rights, yet not given the procedural rights needed to enforce
them. While most minors are granted the legal space to develop into
mature, healthy adults, LGBT minors are often denied the resources
needed for healthy identity development. A procedural right of access
to courts is an important safeguard for these minors, and would allow
them to enforce their constitutional and statutory rights.
A right of access to courts fits with the Supreme Court's parent-
child jurisprudence, and with the social science literature on healthy
development and adolescent decision-making. Therefore, state legisla-
tures should work to codify such a procedural right in their statutes,
making it clear that mature minors have the right to petition for
guardians ad litem without parental notice/consent.
Such a right would not automatically allow a minor to join an
LGBT youth group, or stop a minor from being harassed at school.
Nonetheless, it would allow the minor to argue that her rights should
be vindicated, and if successful, the minor's case could extend rights
to many other minors who would otherwise stand no chance of having
these rights realized. For example, consider a minor who wants to be
out to peers at school and seeks to stop harassment, yet does not want
to be out to her parents. Unless that minor can get to court with the
assurance her parents will remain uninformed, her statutory ight is
meaningless. Thus, although it lacks the immediate effect of a direct
policy change, the right of access to courts would ultimately provide
minors with broader protection; whenever a new law or policy is
passed, minors will have the ability to go to court and challenge the
law.
With a right of access to courts, a minor lacking supportive par-
ents will be included in the legal system, rather than effectively barred
from it. A minor wishing to challenge a school policy forbidding her
from joining gay-straight alliances without parental consent will have a
mechanism to protest. Regardless of her parents' opinion, a minor
harassed in school is guaranteed a cause of action. Similarly, trans-
gender minors will have the right to challenge school policies regard-
less of how their parents feel about their gender expression. In short,
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it will help lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender minors secure the
rights necessary to develop healthy identities, rights long granted to
their heterosexual peers.
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Appendix
Table 1
Specific Distinction
Guidelines for People Right of Judicial
Source of for over Access to Bypass
State Rule Appointment Fourteen Court Statute
Alabama ALA. R. Crv. ALA. R. Civ. Y Mentioned ALA. CODE
P. 17(c) P. 17(d) in cases § 26-21-4
(1992)
Alaska ALASKA R. N N ALASKA ALASKA
Crv. P. CONST. art. STAT.
17(c) I, § 7 § 18.16.030
(2007)
Arizona ARiz. R. Civ. N Y (for tes- ARIz. CONsT. ARIZ. REv.
P. 17(g) tamentary art. XVIII, STAT. ANN.
appoint- § 6 § 36-2152
ment, see (2007)
ARIz. REv.
STAT.
ANN. § 14-
5203
(2005))
Arkansas ARK. R. Crv. ARK. CODE N ARK. CONST. ARK. CODE
P. 17(b); ANN. § 16- art. 2, § 13 ANN. § 20-
ARK. CODE 61-103 16-804
ANN. § 16- (2005) (2007)
61-103
(2005)
California CAL. Cfv. CAL. CIv. V Mentioned CAL.
PROC. CODE PROC. CODE in cases HEALTH &
§ 372 (West § 373 (West SAFrlE CODE
Supp. 2009) 2004) § 123450
(West 2006)
Colorado CoLo. R. N N CoLo. COLO. REv.
Civ. P. CONST. art. STAT. 12-
17(c) II, § 6 37.5-107
(2007)
Connecticut CONN. GEN. CONN. GEN. N CONN. No parental
STAT. § 45a- STAT. § 45a- CONST. art. notification
132 (2008) 132 (2008) 1., § 10 require-
ment, only
counseling,
see CONN.
GEN. STAT.
§ 19a-601
(2007)
Delaware DEL. SUPER. DEL. CODE Y DEL. CONST. DEL. CODE
CT. R. Civ. ANN. tit. 12, art. I, § 9 ANN. tit. 24,
P. 17(c) § 3902 §1784
(2007) (2007)
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Specific Distinction
Guidelines for People Right of Judicial
Source of for over Access to Bypass
State Rule Appointment Fourteen Court Statute
Florida FLA. R. Civ. N N FLA. CONST. FLA. STAT.
P. 1.210(b) art. I, § 21 § 390.01114
(4) (2007)
Georgia GA. CODE N N GA. CONST. GA. CODE
ANN. § 9-11- art. I, § I, ANN. § 15-
17 (2006) para. XII 11-112
(2007)
Hawaii HAw. R. N N N No parental
Crv. P. consent stat-
17(c) ute
Idaho IDAHO R. N N IDAHO IDAHO CODE
Civ. P. CONST.art. I, ANN. § 18-
17(c); § 18 609A (2008)
IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 5-306
(2008)
Illinois N/A N N ILL. CONST. 750 ILL.
art. I, § 12 COMP. STAT.
70/25
(2006)
Indiana IND. CODE IND. CODE N IND. CONST. IND. CODE
§ 34-9-2-1 § 34-9-2-1 art. I, § 12, § 16-34-2-4
(1998) (1998) as extended (2007)
to minors
Iowa IowA R. Civ. N N N IOWA CODE
P. 1.210. § 135L.3
(2006)
Kansas KAN. CIrv. N N N (only KAN. STAT.
PROC. CODE insofar as it ANN. § 65-
ANN. § 60- is under the 6705 (2002)
217(c) right to due
(West 2005) process)
Kentucky Ky. R. CIv. N N Ky. CONST. Ky. REv.
P. 17.03 § 14 (2007) STAT. ANN.
§ 311.732
(3)-(7)
(West 2007)
Louisiana LA. CODE LA. CODE N LA. CONST. LA. REv.
CIv. PROC. CIv. PROC. art. I, § 22 STAT. ANN. §
ANN. art. art. 4063, (2007) 40:1299.35.5
683 (2007) 4067 (2007); (B) (2007)
id. art.
4061.1; id.
art. 4265
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Specific Distinction
Guidelines for People Right of Judicial
Source of for over Access to Bypass
State Rule Appointment Fourteen Court Statute
Maine ME. R. CT. ME. REv. N ME. CONST. ME. REV.
Civ. P. STAT. ANN. art. 1, § 19 STAT. ANN.
17(b) tit. 19-A, (1985) tit. 22,
§ 1507 § 1597-A(6)
(2004) (2007)
Maryland MD. R. Civ. MD. CT. R. N MD. CONST. MD. CODE
P. 2-202 2-202 Dec. of R. ANN.,
art. 19 HEALTH-CEN
(2007) § 20-103
(explicitly (LexisNexis
extended to 2005) (phy-
minors) sicians judg-
ment
instead of
judicial
bypass)
Massachusetts MASS. R. N N MAsS. MASS. GEN.
Civ. P. 17 CONST. pt. LAWS ch.
1, art. XI 112, § 12S
(2007)
Michigan MICH. CT. MICH. R. CT. Y N MICH.
R. CIv. PRO. Civ. P. 2.201 COMP. LAWS
2.201 § 722.904
(2005)
Minnesota MINN. R. MINN. R. Y Suggested MINN. STAT.
Crv. P. 17.02 Civ. P. 17.02 in cases, not § 144.343
explicit subdiv. 6
(2007)
Mississippi Miss. R. Civ. Miss. R. Civ. N N Miss. CODE
P. 17(c) P. 17(d) ANN. § 41-
41-55
(2007)
Missouri Mo. REv. Mo. REv. Y Mo. CONST. Mo. REv.
STAT. STAT. art. I, § 14 STAT.
§ 507.110 §§ 507.120, § 188.028
(2003) 507.130, (2007)
507.140
(2003)
Montana MONT. R. MONT. CODE Y Suggested MONT. CODE
Civ. P. ANN. § 25-5- in cases ANN. § 50-
17(c) 301 (2007) 20-212
(2005)
Nebraska NEB. REv. N N NEB. CONST. No parental
STAT. § 25- art. I, § 13 notification
307 (2007) act
Nevada NEv. R. Civ. NEv. REv. Y Suggested NEV. REv.
P. 17(c) STAT. in cases STAT.
§ 12.050 § 442.255(2)
(2008) (2007)
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Specific Distinction
Guidelines for People Right of Judicial
Source of for over Access to Bypass
State Rule Appointment Fourteen Court Statute
New N.H. REv. N.H. REV. N N.H. CONST. No parental
Hampshire STAT. ANN. STAT. ANN. pt. 1, art. 14 notification
§ 464-A:41 § 464-A:41 (but restric- statute (was
(2007) (2007) tions noted) repealed)
New Jersey N.J. R. N.J. R. N N N.J. STAT.
SUPER. CT. SUPER. CT. ANN.
4:26-2 4:26-2 § 9:17A-1.7
(West 2002)
New Mexico N.M. DIST. N.M. STAT. Y (for N.M. CONST. No parental
CT. R. Civ. § 38-4-10 defen- art. II, § 18 notification
P. 1-017(c); (2008) dant) (cases say statute
N.M. STAT. this provides
§ 38-4-10 rt. of access
(2008) to courts)
New York N.Y. N.Y. C.P.L.R. Y N No parental
C.P.L.R. 1202 notification
1201 (McKinney statute
(McKinney 1997)
1997)
North N.C. GEN. N.C. GEN. N N.C. CONST. N.C. GEN.
Carolina STAT. § 1A-I STAT. § 1A-I art. I, § 18 STAT. § 90-
(2007); N.C. (2007), N.C. (2007) 21.8 (2007)
R. Civ. P. 17 R. Civ. P.
(b) 17(b) (3)
North Dakota N.D. R. Civ. N.D. CENT. Y N.D. CONST. N.D. CENT.
P. 17(b) CODE § 28- art. I, § 9 CODE § 14-
03-01 (2006) 02.1-03.1
(2006)
Ohio OHIO R. N N OHIO OHIO REV.
Civ. P. CONST. art. CODE ANN.
17(b) I, § 16 § 2151.85
(West 2008)
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. N N OKLA. OKLA. STAT.
tit. 12, CONST. art. tit. 63, § 1-
§ 2017 II, § 6 740.3
(2007) (2007)
Oregon OR. R. Civ. OR. R. Crv. Y N No parental
P. 27 P. 27 notification
statute
Pennsylvania PA. R. Civ. PA. R. Civ. Y PA. CONST. 8 PA. CONS.
P. 2027 P. 2031; 20 art. I, § 11 STAT. § 3206
PA. CONS. (2008)
STAT. § 5113
(2005)
Rhode Island R.I. SUPER. N N R.I. CONST. R.I. GEN.
CT. 17(c) art. I, § 5 LAws § 23-
4.7-6 (2007)
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Specific Distinction
Guidelines for People Right of Judicial
Source of for over Access to Bypass
State Rule Appointment Fourteen Court Statute
South S.C. R. Civ. S.C. R. Crv. Y N S.C. CODE
Carolina P. 17(c) P. 17(d) ANN. § 44-
41-32
(2006)
South Dakota S.D. CODI- N N S.D. CONST. S.D. CODI-
FIED LAws art. VI, § 20 FlED LAWS
§ 15-6-17(c) § 34-23A-7.1
(2001) (2007)
Tennessee TENN. R. TENN. CODE V N TENN. CODE
Cirv. P. 17.03 ANN. § 34-1- ANN. § 37-
107 (2007) 10-304
(2007)
Texas TEX. R. Cirv. TEX. R. CIv. N TEX. CONST. TEX. FAM.
P. 44 P. 44 art. I, § 13, CODE ANN.
as extended § 33.003
to minors (Vernon
2007)
Utah UTAH R. UTAH R. UTAH UTAH CODE
Civ. P. Crv. P. 17(c) CONST. art. ANN. § 76-7-
17(b) I, § 11 304.5
(2007)
Vermont VT. R. Civ. N N VT. CONST. No parental
P. 17(b) ch. I, art. 4 notification
statute
Virginia VA. CODE VA. CODE N N No parental
ANN. § 8.01- ANN. § 8.01- notification
8 (2007) 9 (2007) statute
Washington WASH. REv. WASH. REv. Y WASH. No parental
CODE CODE CONST. art. notification
§ 4.08.050 § 4.08.050 I, § 10 statute
(2005) (2005)
West Virginia W. VA. R. N N W. VA. W. VA.
Civ. P. CONST. art. CODE § 16-
17(c) III, § 17 2F-4 (2007)
Wisconsin WIs. STAT. WIS. STAT. Y WIs. CONST. WIs. STAT.
§ 803.01(3) § 803.01(3) art. I, § 9 § 48.375(7)
(a) (2006 & (b) (2006) (2006)
Supp. 2008)
Wyoming Wvo. R. Clv. N N Wvo. WYo. STAT.
P. 17(c) CONST. art. ANN. § 35-6-
1, § 8 118 (2007)
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Table 2: State Procedural Rules 293
FRCP
State Variant? Text of Rule
Federal FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c).
(1) With a Representative. The following representatives
may sue or defend on behalf of a minor or incompetent
person: (A) a general guardian; (B) a committee; (C) a
conservator; or (D) a like fiduciary.
(2) Without a Representative. A minor or an incompetent
person who does not have a duly appointed representative
may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The
court must appoint a guardian ad litem-or issue another
appropriate order-to protect a minor or incompetent
person who is unrepresented in an action.
Alabama Y+ ALA. R. Civ. P. 17(c)-(d).
(c) Minors or Incompetent Persons. Whenever a minor has
a representative, such as a general guardian or like fiduci-
ary, the representative may sue in the name of the minor.
Whenever an incompetent person has a representative
such as a general guardian or a like fiduciary, the represen-
tative may sue or defend in the name of the incompetent
person. If a minor or an incompetent person does not have
a duly appointed representative, that person may sue by
that person's next friend. The court shall appoint a guard-
ian ad litem (1) for a minor defendant, or (2) for an
incompetent person not otherwise represented in an
action and may make any other orders it deems proper for
the protection of the minor or incompetent person. When
the interest of an infant unborn or unconceived is before
the court, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for
such interest. Moreover, if a case occurs not provided for
in these rules in which a minor is or should be made a
party defendant, or if service attempted upon any minor is
incomplete under these rules, the court may direct further
process to bring the minor into court or appoint a guard-
ian ad litem for the minor without service upon the minor
or upon anyone for the minor.
(d) Guardian ad litem; how chosen. Whenever a guardian
ad litem shall be necessary, the court in which the action is
pending shall appoint to serve in that capacity some person
who is qualified to represent the minor or incompetent
person in the capacity of an attorney or solicitor, and must
not select or appoint any person who is related, either by
blood or marriage within the fourth degree, to the plaintiff
or the plaintiff 's attorney, or to the judge or clerk of the
court, or who is in any manner connected with such plain-
tiff or such plaintiff's attorney, or who has been suggested,
nominated, or recommended by the plaintiff or the plain-
tiff's attorney or any person for the plaintiff. If the guard-
ian ad litem is to be appointed for a minor fourteen (14)
293. For consistency, all emphasis has been removed from the reproduced sections.
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years of age or over, such minor may, within thirty (30)
days after perfection of service upon the minor in such
cause, have the minor's choice of a guardian ad litem to
represent the minor in said cause certified by an officer
authorized to take acknowledgments, but if such minor
fails to nominate a guardian ad litem within the thirty-(30-)
day period or before any hearing set in the action, which-
ever is earlier, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem
as before provided. In all cases in which a guardian ad
litem is required, the court must ascertain a reasonable fee
or compensation to be allowed and paid to such guardian
ad litem for services rendered in such cause, to be taxed as
a part of the costs in such action, and which is to be paid
when collected as other costs in the action, to such guard-
ian ad litem.
Alaska Y ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 17(c).
(c) Infants or Incompetent Persons. Whenever an infant or
incompetent person has a representative, such as a general
guardian, committee, conservator, or other like fiduciary,
the representative may sue or defend on behalf of the
infant or incompetent person. An infant or incompetent
person who does not have a duly appointed representative
may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The
court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or
incompetent person not otherwise represented in an
action or shall make such other order as it deems proper
for the protection of the infant or incompetent person.
Arizona Y Aiuz. R. Civ. P. 17 (g).
Whenever an infant or incompetent person has a represen-
tative, such as a general guardian, or similar fiduciary, the
representative may sue or defend on behalf of the infant or
incompetent person. If an infant or incompetent person
does not have a duly appointed representative the infant or
incompetent may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad
litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an
infant or incompetent person not otherwise represented in
an action or shall make such other order as it deems
proper for the protection of the infant or incompetent
person.
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-5203 (2005).
Objection by minor of fourteen or older to testamentary
appointment. A minor of fourteen or more years may pre-
vent an appointment of his testamentary guardian from
becoming effective, or may cause a previously accepted
appointment to terminate, by filing with the court in which
the will is probated a written objection to the appointment
before it is accepted or within thirty days after notice of its
acceptance. An objection may be withdrawn. An objection
does not preclude appointment by the court in a proper
proceeding of the testamentary nominee or any other suit-
able person.
Arkansas ARK. R. CIv. P. 17(b).
Infants or Incompetent Persons. Whenever an infant or
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incompetent person has a guardian, the guardian must sue
or defend on behalf of the infant or incompetent person.
If an infant or incompetent person does not have a duly
appointed guardian, he may sue by his next friend or by a
guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad
litem for an infant or incompetent person not otherwise
represented in an action or shall make such other order as
it deems proper for the protection of the infant or incom-
petent. No judgment shall be rendered against an infant or
incompetent until after a defense by a guardian or guard-
ian ad litem, who shall be appointed by the court upon
application of any interested party and who shall promptly
respond to the claim against the infant or incompetent as
provided by these Rules.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-61-103 (2005).
Actions by infants.
(a) The action of an infant must be brought by his or her
guardian or his or her next friend.
(b) Any person may bring the action of an infant as his or
her next friend, but the court has power to dismiss it if it is
not for the benefit of the infant, or to substitute the guard-
ian of the infant, or another person, as the next friend.
California N CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 372 (West Supp. 2009).
Minors and incompetent persons as parties
(a) When a minor, an incompetent person, or a person for
whom a conservator has been appointed is a party, that
person shall appear either by a guardian or conservator of
the estate or by a guardian ad litem appointed by the court
in which the action or proceeding is pending, or by ajudge
thereof, in each case. A guardian ad litem may be
appointed in any case when it is deemed by the court in
which the action or proceeding is prosecuted, or by ajudge
thereof, expedient to appoint a guardian ad litem to
represent the minor, incompetent person, or person for
whom a conservator has been appointed, notwithstanding
that the person may have a guardian or conservator of the
estate and may have appeared by the guardian or conserva-
tor of the estate. The guardian or conservator of the estate
or guardian ad litem so appearing for any minor, incompe-
tent person, or person for whom a conservator has been
appointed shall have power, with the approval of the court
in which the action or proceeding is pending, to compro-
mise the same, to agree to the order or judgment to be
entered therein for or against the ward or conservatee, and
to satisfy any judgment or order in favor of the ward or
conservatee or release or discharge any claim of the ward
or conservatee pursuant to that compromise. Any money
or other property to be paid or delivered pursuant to the
order or judgment for the benefit of a minor, incompetent
person, or person for whom a conservator has been
appointed shall be paid and delivered as provided in Chap-
ter 4 (commencing with Section 3600) of Part 8 of Division
4 of the Probate Code.
Where reference is made in this section to "incompetent
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person," such reference shall be deemed to include "a per-
son for whom a conservator may be appointed."
Nothing in this section, or in any other provision of this
code, the Civil Code, the Family Code, or the Probate
Code is intended by the Legislature to prohibit a minor
from exercising an intelligent and knowing waiver of his or
her constitutional rights in any proceedings under the
Juvenile Court Law, Chapter 2 (commencing with Section
200) of Part 1 of Division 2 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 373 (West 2004).
Guardian ad litem; appointment procedure.
When a guardian ad litem is appointed, he or she shall be
appointed as follows:
(a) If the minor is the plaintiff the appointment must be
made before the summons is issued, upon the application
of the minor, if the minor is of the age of 14 years, or if
under that age, upon the application of a relative or friend
of the minor.
(b) If the minor is the defendant, upon the application of
the minor, if the minor is of the age of 14 years, and the
minor applies within 10 days after the service of the sum-
mons, or if under that age, or if the minor neglects to
apply, then upon the application of a relative or friend of
the minor, or of any other party to the action, or by the
court on its own motion.
Colorado Y CoLo. R. Cirv. P. 17(c).
(c) Infants or Incompetent Persons. Whenever an infant or
incompetent person has a representative, such as a general
guardian, conservator, or other like fiduciary, the represen-
tative may sue or defend on behalf of the infant or incom-
petent person. If an infant or incompetent person does not
have a duly appointed representative, or such representa-
tive fails to act, he may sue by his next friend or by a guard-
ian ad litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem
for an infant or incompetent person not otherwise repre-
sented in an action or shall make such other order as it
deems proper for the protection of the infant or incompe-
tent person, provided, that in an action in rem it shall not
be necessary to appoint a guardian ad litem for any
unknown person who might be an infant or incompetent
person.
Connecticut N CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-132 (2008).
(a) In any proceeding before a court of probate or the
Superior Court including the Family Support Magistrate
Division, whether acting upon an appeal from probate or
otherwise, the judge or magistrate may appoint a guardian
ad litem for any minor or incompetent, undetermined or
unborn person, or may appoint one guardian ad litem for
two or more of such minors or incompetent, undeter-
mined or unborn persons, if it appears to the judge or
magistrate that one or more persons as individuals, or as
members of a designated class or otherwise, have or may
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have an interest in the proceedings, and that one or more
of them are minors, incompetent persons or persons unde-
termined or unborn at the time of the proceeding.
(b) The appointment shall not be mandatory, but shall be
within the discretion of the judge or magistrate.
(c) Any order or decree passed or action taken in any such
proceeding shall affect all the minors, incompetent per-
sons or persons thereafter born or determined for whom
the guardian ad litem has been appointed, in the same
manner as if they had been of the age of majority and com-
petent and present in court after legal notice at the time of
the action or the issuance of the order or decree.
(d) Any appointment of a guardian ad litem may be made
with or without notice and, if it appears to the judge or
magistrate that it is for the best interests of a minor having
a parent or guardian to have as guardian ad litem some
person other than the parent or guardian, the judge or
magistrate may appoint a disinterested person to be the
guardian ad litem.
(e) When the appointment is made in connection with the
settlement of a decedent's estate or the settlement of the
account of a trustee or other fiduciary, the person so
appointed shall be authorized to represent the minor or
incompetent, undetermined or unborn person in all pro-
ceedings for the settlement of the estate or account and
subsequent accounts of the trustee or other fiduciary, or
until his appointment is terminated by death, resignation
or removal.
(f) The guardian ad litem may be removed by the judge or
magistrate which appointed him, without notice, whenever
it appears to the judge or magistrate to be in the best inter-
ests of the ward or wards of the guardian.
(g) Any guardian ad litem appointed under the provisions
of this section may be allowed reasonable compensation by
the judge or magistrate appointing him and shall be paid
as a part of the expenses of administration.
Delaware Y+ DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CIv. P. 17(c).
(c) Infants or Incompetent Persons. Whenever an infant or
incompetent person has a representative, such as a general
guardian, trustee, committee, conservator, or other like
fiduciary, the representative may sue or defend on behalf
of the infant or incompetent person. An infant or incom-
petent person who does not have a duly appointed repre-
sentative may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad
litem. The Court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an
infant or incompetent person not otherwise represented in
an action or shall make such other order as it deems
proper for the protection of the infant or incompetent
person.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3902 (2007).
(a) Except in accordance with § 925(15) of Title 10 and
§ 3904 of this title, no person shall have any right or
authority as guardian of a disabled person unless the per-
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son has been duly appointed by the Court of Chancery or
admitted by a court of law or equity to defend a suit as
guardian ad litem.
(b) The sole surviving parent of a minor child may, by writ-
ten declaration or last will, name a guardian of the person
or property or both of the parent's child, who shall be
appointed if there is no just cause to the contrary. Any par-
ent may by written declaration or will name a guardian as
to the property which the parent's child may inherit from
any person, who shall be appointed if there is no just cause
to the contrary.
(c) When there is no designation of guardian by written
declaration or last will of the minor's sole surviving parent,
or there is just cause for not appointing the guardian so
designated, a minor 14 years of age or over and resident in
this State may choose a guardian and the Court, if there is
no just cause to the contrary, shall appoint the person
chosen.
(d) When there is no designation of guardian by written
declaration or last will of the minor's sole surviving parent,
or there is just cause for not appointing the guardian so
designated, and a minor is under the age of 14 years, or is
resident out of the State or neglects to choose a proper
guardian, the Court may appoint a guardian according to
its discretion.
(e) When a guardian is appointed for a minor under 14
years of age, unless such appointment is according to a
written declaration or the last will of a minor's sole surviv-
ing parent, if the minor, after arriving at the age of 14
years, chooses another person for a guardian, the Court
shall appoint the person so chosen, if there is no just cause
to the contrary and the preceding guardianship shall be
thereby superseded.
Florida Y FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.210.
(b) Infants or Incompetent Persons. When an infant or
incompetent person has a representative, such as a guard-
ian or other like fiduciary, the representative may sue or
defend on behalf of infant or incompetent person. An
infant or incompetent person who does not have a duly
appointed representative may sue by next friend or by a
guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad
litem for an infant or incompetent person not otherwise
represented in an action or shall make such other order as
it deems proper for the protection of the infant or incom-
petent person.
Georgia Y GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-17 (2006).
(c) Infants or Incompetent persons. Whenever an infant or
incompetent person has a representative, such as a general
guardian, committee, conservator, or other like fiduciary,
the representative may bring or defend an action on behalf
of the infant or incompetent person. If an infant or incom-
petent person does not have a duly appointed representa-
tive, he may bring an action by his next friend or by a
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guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad
litem for an infant or incompetent person not otherwise
represented in an action or shall make such other order as
it deems proper for the protection of the infant or incom-
petent person. No next friend shall be permitted to receive
the proceeds of any personal action, in the name and on
behalf of an infant, or incompetent person, until such next
friend shall have entered into a sufficient bond to the Gov-
ernor, for the use of the infant and the infant's representa-
tives, conditioned well and fully to account for and
concerning such trust, which bond may be sued on by
order of the court in the name of the Governor and for the
use of the infant. Such bond shall be approved by the court
in which the action is commenced and such approval shall
be filed in such clerk's office.
Hawaii V HAw. R. Civ. P. 17(c).
(c) Infants or Incompetent Persons. Whenever an infant or
incompetent person has a guardian, whether appointed as
to that person or property, such guardian appointed as to
property, or if no guardian has been appointed as to prop-
erty, then such guardian appointed as to that person, may
sue or defend on behalf of the infant or incompetent per-
son. If an infant or incompetent person does not have a
duly appointed guardian that person may sue by that per-
son's next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court shall
appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent
person not otherwise represented in an action or shall
make such other order as it deems proper for the protec-
tion of the infant or incompetent person.
Idaho Y+ IDAHO R. Civ. P. 17(c).
(c) Infants or Incompetent Persons. Whenever an infant or
incompetent person has a representative, such as a general
guardian, committee, conservator, or other like fiduciary,
the representative may sue or defend on behalf of the
infant or incompetent person. If an infant or incompetent
person does not have a duly appointed representative the
person may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem.
The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant
or incompetent person not otherwise represented in an
action or shall make such other order as it deems proper
for the protection of the infant or incompetent person.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-306 (2004).
When an infant or an insane or incompetent person is a
party, he must appear either by his general guardian or by
a guardian ad litem appointed by the court in which the
action is pending in each case, or by a judge thereof, or a
probate judge. A guardian ad litem may be appointed in
any case when it is deemed by the court in which the action
or proceeding is prosecuted, or by ajudge thereof, expedi-
ent, to represent the infant, insane or incompetent person
in the action or proceeding, notwithstanding he may have
a general guardian and may have appeared by him.
Illinois N N/A
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Indiana N IND. CODE § 34-9-2-1 (1998).
Sec. 1. All courts have the authority to:
(1) appoint a guardian ad litem to defend the interests of
any person under eighteen (18) years of age impleaded in
a suit; and
(2) permit any person, as next friend, to prosecute a suit in
a minor's behalf.
Iowa N IOWA R. Civ. P. 1.210.
An action of a minor or any person adjudged incompetent
shall be brought by the person's conservator if there is one
or, if not, by the person's guardian if there is one; other-
wise the minor may sue by a next friend, and the incompe-
tent by a conservator or guardian appointed by the court
for that purpose. If it is in the person's best interest, the
court may dismiss such action or substitute another conser-
vator, guardian or next friend.
Kansas Y KAN. CIv. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-217 (West 2005)
(c) Minors or incapacitated persons. Whenever a minor or
incapacitated person has a representative, such as a gen-
eral guardian, committee, conservator, or other like fiduci-
ary, the representative may sue or defend on behalf of the
minor or incapacitated person. If a minor or incapacitated
person does not have a duly appointed representative the
minor or incapacitated person may sue by the minor or
incapacitated person's next friend or by a guardian ad
litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for a
minor or incapacitated person not otherwise represented
in an action or shall make such other order as it deems
proper for the protection of the minor or incapacitated
person.
Kentucky N Ky. R. Civ. P. 17.03.
(1) Actions involving unmarried infants or persons of
unsound mind shall be brought by the party's guardian or
committee, but if there is none, or such guardian or com-
mittee is unwilling or unable to act, a next friend may
bring the action.
(2) Actions involving unmarried infants or persons of
unsound mind shall be defended by the party's guardian
or committee. If there is no guardian or committee or he is
unable or unwilling to act or is a plaintiff, the court, or the
clerk thereof if its judge or judges are not present in the
county, shall appoint a guardian ad litem to defend unless
one has been previously appointed under Rule 4.04(3) or
the warning order attorney has become such guardian
under Rule 4.07(3).
(3) No judgment shall be rendered against an unmarried
infant or person of unsound mind until the party's guard-
ian or committee or the guardian ad litem shall have made
defense or filed a report stating that after careful examina-
tion of the case he is unable to make defense.
Louisiana LA. CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. art. 683 (2007).
A. An unemancipated minor does not have the procedural
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capacity to sue.
B. Except as otherwise provided in Article 4431, the tutor
appointed by a court of this state is the proper plaintiff to
sue to enforce a right of an unemancipated minor, when
one or both of the parents are dead, the parents are
divorced or judicially separated, or the minor is an illigiti-
mate child.
C. The father, as administrator of the estate of his minor
child, is the proper plaintiff to sue to enforce a right of an
unemancipated the legitimate issue of living parents who
are not divorced or judicially separated. The mother, as the
administratrix of the estate of her minor child, is the
proper plaintiff in such an action, when the father is men-
tally incompetent, committed, interdicted, imprisoned, or
an absentee. Moreover, with permission of the judge, the
mother may represent the minor whenever the father fails
or refuses to do so; and in any event she may represent the
minor under the conditions of the laws on the voluntary
management of another's affairs.
D. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph A, B, or C,
an attorney appointed by the court having jurisdiction over
an unemancipated minor who is in the legal custody of the
Department of Social Services is the proper plaintiff to sue
to enforce a right of an unemancipated minor. Upon
application of the tutor or parent who would otherwise be
the proper plaintiff to sue pursuant to Paragraph B or C,
the court shall appoint or substitute as the proper plaintiff
the best qualified among the tutor, parent, or appointed
attorney.
Maine Y+ ME. R. CT. CIV. P. 17
(b) Guardians and Other Representatives. Whenever a
minor or incompetent person has a representative, such as
a general guardian, conservator, or other like fiduciary, the
representative may sue or defend on behalf of the minor
or incompetent person. A minor or incompetent person
who does not have a duly appointed representative may sue
by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court shall
appoint a guardian ad litem for a minor or incompetent
person not otherwise represented in an action or shall
make such other order as it deems proper for the protec-
tion of the minor or incompetent person. In any action in
which there are or may be defendants who have been
served only by publication and who have not appeared, the
court may appoint an agent, guardian ad litem, or next
friend to represent them.
ME. R. CT. GUARDIANS AD LITEM 11 (2007)
B. Appointment on and after March 1, 2000. On and after
March 1, 2000, a judge may appoint, without any findings,
any person then listed on the roster. In addition, a judge
may, for good cause shown and recited in findings in the
order of appointment, appoint any person who, after con-
sideration of all of the circumstances of the particular case,
in the opinion of the appointing judge has the necessary
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skills and experience to serve as a Guardian and represent
the best interests of the child or children in that matter.
Maryland N MD. R. Civ. P. 2-202.
(b) Suits by individuals under disability. An individual
under disability to sue may sue by a guardian or other like
fiduciary or, if none, by next friend, subject to any order of
court for the protection of the individual under disability.
When a minor is in the sole custody of one of its parents,
that parent has the exclusive right to sue on behalf of the
minor for a period of one year following the accrual of the
cause of action, and if the custodial parent fails to institute
suit within the one year period, any person interested in
the minor shall have the fight to institute suit on behalf of
the minor as next friend upon first mailing notice to the
last known address of the custodial parent.
Massachusetts Y MAss. R. Civ. P. 17.
(b) Infants or Incompetent Persons. Whenever an infant
or incompetent person has a representative, such as a gen-
eral guardian, conservator, or other like fiduciary, the rep-
resentative may sue or defend on behalf of the infant or
incompetent person. If an infant or incompetent person
does not have a duly appointed representative, he may sue
by his next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court
shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or incompe-
tent person not otherwise represented in an action or shall
make such other order as it deems proper for the protec-
tion of the infant or incompetent person.
MICH. CT. R. Crv. P. 2.201 (E) (1).
(a) If a minor or incompetent person has a conservator,
actions may be brought and must be defended by the con-
servator on behalf of the minor or incompetent person.
(b) If a minor or incompetent person does not have a con-
servator to represent the person as plaintiff, the court shall
appoint a competent and responsible person to appear as
next friend on his or her behalf, and the next friend is
responsible for the costs of the action.
(c) If the minor or incompetent person does not have a
conservator to represent the person as defendant, the
action may not proceed until the court appoints a guardian
ad litem, who is not responsible for the costs of the action
unless, by reason of personal misconduct, he or she is spe-
cifically charged costs by the court. It is unnecessary to
appoint a representative for a minor accused of a civil
infraction. Appointment of a next friend or guardian ad
litem shall be made by the court as follows:
(i) if the party is a minor 14 years of age or older, on the
minor's nomination, accompanied by a written consent of
the person to be appointed;
(ii) if the party is a minor under 14 years of age or an
incompetent person, on the nomination of the party's next
of kin or of another relative or friend the court deems suit-
able, accompanied by a written consent of the person to be
appointed; or
Michigan
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(iii) if a nomination is not made or approved within 21
days after service of process, on motion of the court or of a
party.
(b) The court may refuse to appoint a representative it
deems unsuitable.
Minnesota N MINN. R. Civ. P. 17.02.
Whenever a party to an action is an infant or is incompe-
tent and has a representative duly appointed under the
laws of this state or the laws of a foreign state or country,
the representative may sue or defend on behalf of such
party. A party who is an infant or is incompetent and is not
so represented shall be represented by a guardian ad litem
appointed by the court in which the action is pending or is
to be brought. The guardian ad litem shall be a resident of
this state, shall file a consent and oath with the court
administrator, and shall give such bond as the court may
require. A guardian ad litem appointed under this Rule is
not a guardian ad litem within the meaning of the Rules of
Guardian Ad Litem Procedure in Juvenile and Family
Court and is not governed by those Rules except when
appointed in a paternity suit.
Any person, including an infant party over the age of 14
years and under no other legal disability, may apply under
oath for the appointment of a guardian ad litem. The
application of the party or the party's spouse or parents or
testamentary or other guardian shall have priority over
other applications. If no such appointment is made on
behalf of a defendant party before answer or default, the
adverse party or a party's attorney may apply for such
appointment, and in such case the court shall allow the
guardian ad litem a reasonable time to respond to the
complaint.
The application for appointment shall show (1) the name,
age and address of the party, (2) if the party is a minor, the
names and addresses of the parents, and, in the event of
their death or the abandonment of the minor, the name
and address of the party's custodian or testamentary or
other guardian, if any, (3) the name and address of the
party's spouse, if any, and (4) the name, age, address, and
occupation of the person whose appointment is sought.
If the appointment is applied for by the party or by a
spouse, parent, custodian or testamentary or other guard-
ian of the party, the court may hear the application with or
without notice. In all other cases written notice of the hear-
ing on the application shall be given at such time as the
court shall prescribe, and shall be served upon the party,
the party's spouse, parent, custodian and testamentary or
other guardian, if any, and if the party is an inmate of a
public institution, the chief executive officer thereof. If the
party is a nonresident or, after diligent search, cannot be
found within the state, notice shall be given to such per-
sons and in such manner as the court may direct.
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Mississippi Y+ Miss. R. Crv. P. 17.
(c) Infants or Persons Under Legal Disability. Whenever a
party to an action is an infant or is under legal disability
and has a representative duly appointed under the laws of
the State of Mississippi or the laws of a foreign state or
country, the representative may sue or defend on behalf of
such party. A party defendant who is an infant or is under
legal disability and is not so represented may be repre-
sented by a guardian ad litem appointed by the court when
the court considers such appointment necessary for the
protection of the interest of such defendant. The guardian
ad litem shall be a resident of the State of Mississippi, shall
file his consent and oath with the clerk, and shall give such
bond as the court may require. The court may make any
other orders it deems proper for the protection of the
defendant. When the interest of an unborn or uncon-
ceived person is before the court, the court may appoint a
guardian ad litem for such interest. If an infant or incom-
petent person does not have a duly appointed representa-
tive, he may sue by his next friend.
(d) Guardian Ad Litem; How Chosen. Whenever a guard-
ian ad litem shall be necessary, the court in which the
action is pending shall appoint an attorney to serve in that
capacity. In all cases in which a guardian ad litem is
required, the court must ascertain a reasonable fee or com-
pensation to be allowed and paid to such guardian ad litem
for his service rendered in such cause, to be taxed as a part
of the cost in such action.
Missouri N Mo. REV. STAT. § 507.110 (2003).
Suits by infants may only be commenced and prosecuted,
either: First, by a duly appointed guardian or conservator
of such infant; or, second, by a next friend appointed for
him in such suit; or, third, if asserted by counterclaim, by a
guardian ad litem.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 507.120 (2003).
The appointment of a next friend for an infant shall be
made by the court in which the suit is intended to be
brought, or by a judge or clerk thereof.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 507.130 (2003).
Such appointment shall be made on the petition in writing
of such infant, if of the age of fourteen years, and the writ-
ten consent of the person proposed to be next friend to
such infant acknowledged before, or proved to the court or
officer making the appointment.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 507.140 (2003).
If such infant be under the age of fourteen years, the
appointment of a next friend may be made upon like peti-
tion of a relative or friend of the infant, in which case a
notice thereof must first be given to the person with whom
such infant resides.
Montana Y+ MoNr. R. Civ. P. 17.
(c) Infants or Incompetent Persons. Whenever an infant or
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incompetent person has a representative, such as a general
guardian, or other like fiduciary, the representative may
sue or defend on behalf of the infant or incompetent per-
son. An infant or incompetent person who does not have a
duly appointed representative may sue by a next friend or
by a guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint a guardian
ad litem for an infant or incompetent person not otherwise
represented in an action or shall make such other order as
it deems proper for the protection of the infant or incom-
petent person, or in any case where the court deems it
expedient a guardian ad litem may be appointed to
represent an infant or incompetent person, even though
the infant or incompetent person may have a general
guardian and may have appeared by that general guardian.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-5-301 (2007).
When a guardian ad litem is appointed by the court, he
must be appointed as follows:
(1) when the minor is plaintiff, upon the application of the
minor if he be of the age of 14 years or, if under that age,
upon the application of a relative or friend of the minor;
(2) when the minor is defendant, upon the application of
the minor if he be of the age of 14 years and apply within
10 days after the service of the summons or, if under that
age or if he neglects so to apply, upon the application of a
relative or friend of the minor or of any other party to the
action;
(3) when an insane or incompetent person is party to an
action or proceeding, upon the application of a relative or
friend of such insane or incompetent person or of any
other party to the action or proceeding.
Nebraska N NEB. RaV. STAT. § 25-307 (2007).
Except as provided by the Nebraska Probate Code, the
action of an infant shall be commenced, maintained, and
prosecuted by his or her guardian or next friend. Such
actions may be dismissed with or without prejudice by the
guardian or next friend only with approval of the court.
When the action is commenced by his next friend, the
court has power to dismiss it, if it is not for the benefit of
the infant, or to substitute the guardian of the infant; or
any person, as the next friend. Any action taken pursuant
to this section shall be binding upon the infant.
Nevada Y+ NEv. R. Crv. P. 17.
(c) Infants or Incompetent Persons. Whenever an infant or
incompetent person has a representative, such as a general
guardian, committee, conservator, or other like fiduciary,
the representative may sue or defend on behalf of the
infant or incompetent person. An infant or incompetent
person who does not have a duly appointed representative
may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The
court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or
incompetent person not otherwise represented in an
action or shall make such other order as it deems proper
for the protection of the infant or incompetent person.
[Vol. 43
LGBT MINORS AND SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
NEv. REv. STAT. § 12.050 (2008).
When a guardian ad litem is appointed by the court, he
must be appointed as follows:
1. When the infant is plaintiff, upon the application of the
infant if he be of the age of 14 years, or, if under that age,
upon the application of a relative or friend of the infant.
2. When the infant is defendant, upon the application of
the infant if he be of the age of 14 years and apply within
10 days after the service of the summons, or, if under that
age or if he neglect to so apply, then upon the application
of a relative or friend of the infant, or any other party to
the action.
New Hampshire N N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:41 (2007).
When before or during the hearing on any proceeding in
any court it appears to the court that the interest or rights
of a legally incapacitated person by age or other cause or
circumstance are not fully represented or upon the request
of any interested person, the court may appoint a compe-
tent and disinterested person to act as guardian ad litem
for such legally incapacitated person and to represent such
person's interest in the case. The guardian ad litem shall
have none of the rights of the general guardian. The per-
son appointed guardian ad litem shall make oath to per-
form such duty faithfully and impartially. A bond may be
required of the guardian ad litem at the discretion of the
court.
N.J. R. SUPER. CT. 4:26-2.
(a) Representation by Guardian. Except as otherwise pro-
vided by law or Rule 4:26-3 (virtual representation), a
minor or mentally incapacitated person shall be repre-
sented in an action by the guardian of either the person or
the property, appointed in this State, or if no such guard-
ian has been appointed or a conflict of interest exists
between guardian and ward or for other good cause, by a
guardian ad litem appointed by the court in accordance
with paragraph (b) of this rule.
(b) Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem.
(2) Appointment on Petition. The court may appoint a
guardian ad litem for a minor or an alleged mentally inca-
pacitated person, upon the verified petition of a friend on
his or her behalf. In an action in which the fiduciary seeks
to have the account settled or has a personal interest in the
matter, the petition shall state whether or not the guardian
ad litem therein nominated was proposed by the fiduciary
or the fiduciary's attorney. Each petition shall be accompa-
nied by the sworn consent of the proposed guardian ad
litem, stating his or her relationship to the minor or
alleged mentally incapacitated person and certifying that
he or she has no interest in the litigation, or if such interest
exists, setting forth the nature thereof, and that he or she
will with undivided fidelity perform the duties of guardian
ad litem, if appointed. The court shall appoint the guard-
New Jersey
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ian ad litem so proposed unless it finds good cause for not
doing so, in which case it shall afford the petitioner oppor-
tunity to file a new petition seeking the appointment of
another person within 10 days of the rejection. If such new
petition is not filed within such time, or if filed, is not
granted, the court, when designating some other person as
guardian ad litem, shall state for the record its reasons for
rejecting petitioner's nominee. A conflict of interest
between the petitioner and the minor or alleged mentally
incapacitated person shall be good cause for rejection of
the petitioner's nominee. Only one guardian ad litem shall
be appointed for all minors or alleged mentally incapaci-
tated persons unless a conflict of interest exists.
New Mexico Y N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-017.
C. Infants or incompetent persons. When an infant or
incompetent person has a representative, such as a general
guardian, or other like fiduciary, the representative may
sue or defend on behalf of the infant or incompetent per-
son. An infant or incompetent person who does not have a
duly appointed representative may sue by next friend or by
a guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad
litem for an infant or incompetent person not otherwise
represented in an action or shall make such other order as
it deems proper for the protection of the infant or incom-
petent person.
New York N N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1201 (McKinney 1997).
Unless the court appoints a guardian ad litem, an infant
shall appear by the guardian of his property or, if there is
no such guardian, by a parent having legal custody, or, if
there is no such parent, by another person or agency hav-
ing legal custody, or, if the infant is married, by an adult
spouse residing with the infant, a person judicially declared
to be incompetent shall appear by the committee of his
property, and a conservatee shall appear by the conservator
of his property. A person shall appear by his guardian ad
litem if he is an infant and has no guardian of his property,
parent, or other person or agency having legal custody, or
adult spouse with whom he resides, or if he is an infant,
person judicially declared to be incompetent, or a con-
servatee as defined in section 77.01 of the mental hygiene
law and the court so directs because of a conflict of interest
or for other cause, or if he is an adult incapable of ade-
quately prosecuting or defending his rights.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1202 (McKinney 1997).
(a) By whom motion made. The court in which an action is
triable may appoint a guardian ad litem at any stage in the
action upon its own initiative or upon the motion of:
1. an infant party if he is more than fourteen years of age;
or
2. a relative, friend or a guardian, committee of the prop-
erty, or conservator; or
3. any other party to the action if a motion has not been
made under paragraph one or two within ten days after
completion of service.
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(b) Notice of motion. Notice of a motion for appointment
of a guardian ad litem for a person shall be served upon
the guardian of his property, upon his committee or upon
his conservator, or if he has no such guardian, committee,
or conservator, upon the person with whom he resides.
Notice shall also be served upon the person who would be
represented if he is more than fourteen years of age and
has not been judicially declared to be incompetent.
(c) Consent. No order appointing a guardian ad litem shall
be effective until a written consent of the proposed guard-
ian has been submitted to the court together with an affi-
davit stating facts showing his ability to answer for any
damage sustained by his negligence or misconduct.
North Carolina N N.C. GEN. STAT. § lA-I (2007).
(b) Infants, incompetents, etc.-
(1) Infants, etc., Sue by Guardian or Guardian Ad Litem.-
In actions or special proceedings when any of the parties
plaintiff are infants or incompetent persons, whether
residents or nonresidents of this State, they must appear by
general or testamentary guardian, if they have any within
the State or by guardian ad litem appointed as hereinafter
provided; but if the action or proceeding is against such
guardian, or if there is no such known guardian, then such
persons may appear by guardian ad litem.
(c) Guardian ad litem for infants, insane or incompetent
persons; appointment procedure.-When a guardian ad
litem is appointed to represent an infant or insane or
incompetent person, he must be appointed as follows:
(1) When an infant or insane or incompetent person is
plaintiff, the appointment shall be made at any time prior
to or at the time of the commencement of the action, upon
the written application of any relative or friend of said
infant or insane or incompetent person or by the court on
its own motion.
North Dakota Y+ N.D. R. Civ. P. 17.
(b) Infants or Incompetent persons. Whenever an infant
or incompetent person has a representative, such as a gen-
eral guardian, or other like fiduciary, the representative
may sue or defend on behalf of the infant or incompetent
person. An infant or incompetent person who does not
have a duly appointed representative may sue by a next
friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint a
guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent person not
otherwise represented in an action or shall make such
other order as it considers proper for the protection of the
infant or incompetent person; or, if the court considers it
expedient, may appoint a guardian ad litem to represent
an infant or incompetent person, even though the infant
or incompetent person may have a general guardian and
may have appeared.
N.D. CENW. CODE § 28-03-01 (2006).
When an infant is plaintiff, a guardian ad litem may be
appointed upon the application of the infant if the infant
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is at least fourteen years of age. If the infant is under that
age, the application may be made by the infant's guardian
or conservator, if the infant has one, or by a relative or
friend of the infant. If the application is made by a relative
or friend, notice thereof must be given to the guardian or
conservator, if there is one, and if not, then to the person
with whom the infant resides.
Ohio V OHio R. Crv. P. 17.
(B) Minors or incompetent persons.
Whenever a minor or incompetent person has a represen-
tative, such as a guardian or other like fiduciary, the repre-
sentative may sue or defend on behalf of the minor or
incompetent person. If a minor or incompetent person
does not have a duly appointed representative the minor
may sue by a next friend or defend by a guardian ad litem.
When a minor or incompetent person is not otherwise rep-
resented in an action the court shall appoint a guardian ad
litem or shall make such other order as it deems proper for
the protection of such minor or incompetent person.
Oklahoma V OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2017 (2007).
C. INFANTS OR INCOMPETENT PERSONS. Whenever
an infant or incompetent person has a representative, such
as a general guardian, committee, conservator, or other
like fiduciary, the representative may sue or defend on
behalf of the infant or incompetent person. If an infant or
incompetent person does not have a duly appointed repre-
sentative he may sue by his next friend or by a guardian ad
litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an
infant or incompetent person not otherwise represented in
an action or shall make such other order as it deems
proper for the protection of the infant or incompetent per-
son.
OR. R. Civ. P. 27.
A. Appearance of minor parties by guardian or conserva-
tor. When a minor, who has a conservator of such minor's
estate or a guardian, is a party to any action, such minor
shall appear by the conservator or guardian as may be
appropriate or, if the court so orders, by a guardian ad
litem appointed by the court in which the action is
brought. If the minor does not have a conservator of such
minor's estate or a guardian, the minor shall appear by a
guardian ad litem appointed by the court. The court shall
appoint some suitable person to act as guardian ad litem:
A(1) When the minor is plaintiff, upon application of the
minor, if the minor is 14 years of age or older, or upon
application of a relative or friend of the minor if the minor
is under 14 years of age.
A(2) When the minor is defendant, upon application of
the minor, if the minor is 14 years of age or older, filed
within the period of time specified by these rules or other
rule or statute for appearance and answer after service of
summons, or if the minor fails so to apply or is under 14
Oregon
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years of age, upon application of any other party or of a
relative or friend of the minor.
Pennsylvania N PA. R. Civ. P. 2027.
When a party to an action, a minor shall be represented by
a guardian who shall supervise and control the conduct of
the action in behalf of the minor.
PA. R. Civ. P. 2031.
(a) A minor plaintiff may select a guardian, but such selec-
tion shall not bar the court from removing the guardian
for cause in accordance with these rules.
(b) If a minor party to an action is not represented, the
court shall appoint a guardian for the minor either upon
its own motion or upon the petition of (1) the minor party,
(2) a guardian of the minor appointed by any court of
competent jurisdiction, or by a will duly probated, (3) any
relative of the minor, or (4) any other party to the action.
(c) The petition shall state the name and address of the
person proposed as guardian, and the guardian's relation-
ship, if any, to the subject matter of the action or to any of
the parties thereto. In case the person proposed as guard-
ian is a guardian appointed by any court of competent
jurisdiction or by a will duly probated, the petition shall
contain a reference to the record of such appointment.
(d) When the petition is filed by the minor the court may
make the appointment ex parte.
(e) When the petition is filed by a person other than the
minor, the court shall direct a rule to be served upon the
minor or upon such other person as the court may desig-
nate to show cause why the prayer of the petition should
not be granted.
PA. CONS. STAT. § 5113 (West 2005).
A person of the same religious persuasion as the parents of
the minor shall be preferred as guardian of his person. A
person nominated by a minor over the age of 14, if found
by the court to be qualified and suitable, shall be preferred
as guardian of his person or estate.
Rhode Island Y R.I. R. SUPER. CT. 17.
(c) Infants or Incompetent Persons. Whenever an infant or
incompetent person has a representative, such as a general
guardian, conservator, or other like fiduciary, the represen-
tative may sue or defend on behalf of the infant or incom-
petent person. If an infant or incompetent person does not
have a duly appointed representative, the infant or incom-
petent person may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad
litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an
infant or incompetent person not otherwise represented in
an action or shall make such other order as it deems
proper for the protection of the infant or incompetent per-
son.
South Carolina Y+ S.C. R. Civ. P. 17.
(c) Minor or Incompetent Persons. Whenever a minor or
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incompetent person has a representative, such as a general
guardian, committee, conservator, or other like fiduciary,
the representative may sue or defend on behalf of the
minor or incompetent person. If a minor or incompetent
person does not have a duly appointed representative he
may sue by his next friend or by guardian ad litem. The
court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for a minor or
incompetent person not otherwise represented in an
action or shall make such order as it deems proper for the
protection of the minor or incompetent person. A person
imprisoned outside this State shall appear by guardian ad
litem in an action by or against him; but if imprisoned in
this State, and not a minor or incompetent, the court may,
in its discretion appoint a guardian ad litem or order him
to be brought personally to the trial to testify in accor-
dance with Rule 43(a).
(d) Guardians Ad Litem. Guardians ad litem appearing in
the courts of this State, or before any agency, board or
commission from which an appeal to the courts of this
State shall lie, shall be qualified and appointed in accor-
dance with the provisions of this rule.
(1) Who May Appoint. Guardians ad litem may be
appointed by the court in which the action is pending, the
judge of probate, the clerk of court, or the master-in-equity
of the county wherein the minor, or incompetent or
imprisoned person resides, or in the county in which the
action is pending or is to be filed.
(2) Who May Be Appointed. The general guardian of a
minor or incompetent person may be appointed guardian
ad litem, if he has no interest adverse to that of the person
whom he represents in the action. No other person may be
appointed guardian ad litem of a minor or incompetent or
imprisoned person unless he be fully competent to under-
stand and protect the rights of the person whom he repre-
sents, has no interest adverse to that of the person whose
interest he represents, is not connected or associated with
the attorney or counsel of the adverse party, and is not the
attorney for the adverse party. If the guardian ad litem is
an attorney, it shall not be necessary that he be repre-
sented by an additional attorney; but the attorney of the
adverse party shall not represent the guardian ad litem.
(3) Minors. The guardian ad litem for a minor party shall
be appointed upon the application of the minor, if he be
of the age of 14 years or over; if under that age upon the
application of his parent, general or testamentary guard-
ian; or of a relative or friend. If application be made by a
relative or friend, other than a parent, notice thereof must
first be given to the minor's general or testamentary guard-
ian, if he has one; if he has none, then to the person with
whom such minor resides.
South Dakota Y S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 15-6-17(c) (2001).
Whenever a minor or incompetent person has a guardian
or conservator, such guardian or conservator may sue or
defend on behalf of the minor or incompetent person. If
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the minor or incompetent person does not have a guard-
ian or conservator, he may sue by a guardian ad litem. The
court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for a minor or
incompetent person not otherwise represented in an
action or shall make such other order as it deems proper
for the protection of the minor or incompetent person and
may make such appointment notwithstanding an appear-
ance by a guardian or conservator. Unless the court other-
wise orders, no guardian ad litem shall be permitted to
receive any money or other property of his ward except
costs and expenses allowed to such guardian ad litem by
the court or recovered by the ward in the action until such
guardian ad litem has given sufficient security approved by
the court to account for and apply such money or property
under direction of the court. Such guardian ad litem may
with the approval of the court settle or compromise in
behalf of his ward, the case in which he is appearing and
any judgment entered therein.
Tennessee Y+ TENN. R. Civ. P. 17.03.
Whenever an infant or incompetent person has a represen-
tative, such as a general guardian, conservator, or other
like fiduciary, the representative may sue or defend on
behalf of the infant or incompetent person. If an infant or
incompetent person does not have a duly appointed repre-
sentative, or if justice requires, he or she may sue by next
friend. The court shall at any time after the filing of the
complaint appoint a guardian ad litem to defend an action
for an infant or incompetent person who does not have a
duly appointed representative, or whenever justice
requires. The court may in its discretion allow the guardian
ad litem a reasonable fee for services, to be taxed as costs.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1-107 (2007).
(a) (1) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection (a),
on the filing of a petition for the appointment of a fiduci-
ary, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to
represent the respondent. The court also may appoint a
guardian ad litem to represent the interest of the minor or
disabled person in any proceeding brought by the fiduci-
ary. If the respondent is represented by adversary counsel
who has made an appearance for the respondent, no
guardian ad litem shall be appointed.
(2) The court may waive the appointment of a guardian ad
litem if the petitioner or at least one (1) of the petitioners
for the appointment is:
(A) A parent of the minor for whom a guardian is sought;
(B) A minor who has attained fourteen (14) years of age;
or
(C) An adult respondent.
(3) The court may waive the appointment of a guardian ad
litem if the court determines the waiver is in the best inter-
ests of the minor or disabled person.
Texas N TEx. R. Ctv. P. 44.
Minors, lunatics, idiots, or persons non compos mentis
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who have no legal guardian may sue and be represented by
"next friend" under the following rules:
(1) Such next friend shall have the same rights concerning
such suits as guardians have, but shall give security for
costs, or affidavits in lieu thereof, when required.
(2) Such next friend or his attorney of record may with the
approval of the court compromise suits and agree to judg-
ments, and such judgments, agreements and compromises,
when approved by the court, shall be forever binding and
conclusive upon the party plaintiff in such suit.
Utah Y+ UTAH R. Civ. P. 17.
(b) Minors or incompetent persons. An unemancipated
minor or an insane or incompetent person who is a party
must appear either by a general guardian or by a guardian
ad litem appointed in the particular case by the court in
which the action is pending. A guardian ad litem may be
appointed in any case when it is deemed by the court in
which the action or proceeding is prosecuted expedient to
represent the minor, insane or incompetent person in the
action or proceeding, notwithstanding that the person may
have a general guardian and may have appeared by the
guardian. In an action in rem it shall not be necessary to
appoint a guardian ad litem for any unknown party who
might be a minor or an incompetent person.
(c) Guardian ad litem; how appointed. A guardian ad litem
appointed by a court must be appointed as follows:
(1) When the minor is plaintiff, upon the application of
the minor, if the minor is of the age of fourteen years, or if
under that age, upon the application of a relative or friend
of the minor.
(2) When the minor is defendant, upon the application of
the minor if the minor is of the age of fourteen years and
applies within 20 days after the service of the summons, or
if under that age or if the minor neglects so to apply, then
upon the application of a relative or friend of the minor,
or of any other party to the action.
(3) When a minor defendant resides out of this state, the
plaintiff, upon motion therefor, shall be entitled to an
order designating some suitable person to be guardian ad
litem for the minor defendant, unless the defendant or
someone in behalf of the defendant within 20 days after
service of notice of such motion shall cause to be
appointed a guardian for such minor. Service of such
notice may be made upon the defendant's general or testa-
mentary guardian located in the defendant's state; if there
is none, such notice, together with the summons in the
action, shall be served in the manner provided for publica-
tion of summons upon such minor, if over fourteen years
of age, or, if under fourteen years of age, by such service
on the person with whom the minor resides. The guardian
ad litem for such nonresident minor defendant shall have
20 days after appointment in which to plead to the action.
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Vermont Y VT. R. Civ. P. 17.
(b) Guardians and Other Representatives. Whenever an
infant or incompetent person has a representative, such as
a general guardian, conservator, or other like fiduciary, the
representative may sue or defend on behalf of the infant or
incompetent person. An infant or incompetent person
who does not have a duly appointed representative may sue
by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court shall
appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent
person not otherwise represented in an action or shall
make such other order as it deems proper for the protec-
tion of the infant or incompetent person. In any action in
which there are or may be defendants who have been
served only by publication and who have not appeared, the
court may appoint an agent, guardian ad litem, or next
friend to represent them.
Virginia N VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-8 (2007).
Any minor entitled to sue may do so by his next friend.
Either or both parents may sue on behalf of a minor as his
next friend.
Washington N WASH. REV. CODE § 4.08.050 (2005).
Except as provided under RCW 26.50.020 and
28A.225.035, when an infant is a party he or she shall
appear by guardian, or if he or she has no guardian, or in
the opinion of the court the guardian is an improper per-
son, the court shall appoint one to act. Said guardian shall
be appointed as follows:
(1) When the infant is plaintiff, upon the application of
the infant, if he or she be of the age of fourteen years, or if
under that age, upon the application of a relative or friend
of the infant.
(2) When the infant is defendant, upon the application of
the infant, if he or she be of the age of fourteen years, and
applies within thirty days after the service of the summons;
if he or she be under the age of fourteen, or neglects to
apply, then upon the application of any other party to the
action, or of a relative or friend of the infant.
West Virginia Y W. VA. R. Civ. P. 17.
(c) Infants, Incompetent Persons, or Convicts. Whenever
an infant, incompetent person, or convict has a representa-
tive, such as a general guardian, curator, committee, con-
servator, or other like fiduciary, the representative may sue
or defend on behalf of the infant, incompetent person, or
convict. An infant, incompetent person, or convict who
does not have a duly appointed representative may sue by a
next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court or clerk
shall appoint a discreet and competent attorney at law as
guardian ad litem for an infant, incompetent person, or
convict not otherwise represented in an action, or shall
make such other order as it deems proper for the protec-
tion of the infant, incompetent person, or convict. A
guardian ad litem is deemed a party for purposes of ser-
vice; failure to serve a guardian ad litem in circumstances
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where service upon a party is required constitutes failure to
serve a party.
Wisconsin N Wis. STAT. § 803.01 (2006 & Supp. 2008).
(3) Minors or individuals alleged or adjudicated
incompetent.
(a) Appearance by guardian or guardian ad litem. If a
party to an action or proceeding is a minor, or if a party is
adjudicated incompetent or alleged to be incompetent, the
party shall appear by an attorney, by the guardian of the
estate of the party who may appear by attorney, or by a
guardian ad litem who may appear by an attorney. A guard-
ian ad litem shall be appointed in all cases in which the
minor or individual alleged to be incompetent has no
guardian of the estate, in which the guardian fails to
appear and act on behalf of the ward or individual adjudi-
cated incompetent, or in which the interest of the minor
or individual adjudicated incompetent is adverse to that of
the guardian. Except as provided in section 807.10, if the
guardian does appear and act and the interests of the
guardian are not adverse to the minor or individual adjudi-
cated incompetent, a guardian ad litem may not be
appointed. Except as provided in section 879.23(4), if the
interests of the minor or individual alleged to be or adjudi-
cated incompetent are represented by an attorney of
record, the court shall, except upon good cause stated in
the record, appoint that attorney as the guardian ad litem.
(b) Guardian ad litem.
1. The guardian ad litem shall be appointed by a circuit
court of the county where the action is to be commenced
or is pending, except that the guardian ad litem shall be
appointed by a circuit court commissioner of the county in
actions to establish paternity that are before the circuit
court commissioner.
2. When the plaintiff is a minor 14 years of age or over,
upon the plaintiffs application or upon the states applica-
tion under section 767.407(1)(c); or if the plaintiff is
under that age or is adjudicated incompetent or alleged to
be incompetent, upon application of the plaintiffs guard-
ian or of a relative or friend or upon application of the
state under section 767.407(1)(c). If the application is
made by a relative, a friend, or the state, notice thereof
must first be given to the guardian if the plaintiff has one
in this state; if the plaintiff has none, then to the person
with whom the minor or individual adjudicated incompe-
tent resides or who has the minor or individual adjudicated
incompetent in custody.
3. When the defendant is a minor 14 years of age or over,
upon the defendants application made within 20 days after
the service of the summons or other original process; if the
defendant is under that age or neglects to so apply or is
adjudicated incompetent or alleged to be incompetent,
then upon the court's own motion or upon the application
of any other party or any relative or friend or the defen-
dant's guardian upon such notice of the application as the
court directs or approves.
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Wyoming Y Wvo. R. Clv. P. 17.
(c) Minors or Incompetent Persons. Whenever a minor or
an incompetent person has a representative, such as a
guardian, conservator, or other like fiduciary, the represen-
tative may sue or defend on behalf of the minor or incom-
petent person. If a minor or an incompetent person does
not have a duly appointed representative, or such repre-
sentative fails to act, the minor or the incompetent person
may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The
court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for a minor or an
incompetent person not otherwise represented in an
action or shall make such other order as it deems proper
for the protection of the minor or the incompetent person.
934 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43
